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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the founding and development of the city of Birmingham,
Alabama, focusing on the establishment and growth of its earliest, most vital
infrastructure: railroads and waterworks. Early chapters explain how and why the city
came to be carved from the wilderness, while later chapters describe how railroads and
waterworks facilities made it possible for a set of frontier farms and villages- isolated,
with no nearby river- to rapidly grow into a booming industrial metropolis.
Analyzing the actions of Birmingham’s founder- the Elyton Land Company- and
those of its subsidiaries- the Birmingham Water Works Company and the Highland
Avenue and Belt Railroad Company- establishes that all three companies had dramatic
positive effects on the city’s growth and prosperity, while being motivated by profit as
well as the public good.

ix, 143 pages
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INTRODUCTION

When Alabama became a state in 1819, Jefferson County and Birmingham did not
exist. By 1900, Jefferson was the state’s most populous county, and Birmingham was the
Southeast region’s industrial powerhouse. Almost all that growth took place during the
nineteenth century’s last three decades, as the broken and defeated South began
recovering from four years of Civil War. In the span of that single generation, a loose
collection of remote and isolated uplands villages came together to form an urban entity
that dwarfed all other of the state’s cities.
This remarkable transformation was sparked by a geologic anomaly. Beneath an
area known locally as Jones Valley, unlike anywhere else in the world, massive deposits
of coal, iron ore, and limestone- the three minerals required to make iron- lay embedded
in one tight geographic extent. Prior to the Civil War, a few visionaries recognized the
profit potential of the area’s untapped minerals and set about devising the means to
extract them. Their efforts bore little fruit until 1871, when a cascading series of events
brought together the men, machines, and capital needed to establish a great industrial city.
For the new metropolis to be formed, its foundation had to be carved from Jones
Valley’s fields, forest, and brush. To that end, in December, 1870, ten local entrepreneurs
banded together to form a corporation known as the Elyton Land Company. After
purchasing 4,150 acres of Jones Valley real estate, the new corporation surveyed and
1

2
mapped its lands. Corn rows and irregular cow paths soon gave way to a roughly cleared
grid of avenues and streets: the new city’s first and most basic infrastructure. From those
earliest days until the dawn of the twentieth century and beyond, the City of Birmingham
took shape in accordance with this company’s original 1871 layout.
As Birmingham grew from a village into a town, the Elyton Land Company
assumed the leading role in providing residents with essential utility services. Besides
inducing two long-haul railroads to open the city for development, the company built the
community’s first waterworks. As the town grew into a city, and then into a metropolis,
the company expanded its waterworks to keep pace with the area’s rapid growth. Though
the general public greatly benefitted from the company’s waterworks investments, fees
that consumers paid for water accrued as fat profits for the company. Those profits- taken
in part at the expense of the people- eroded the goodwill that the Elyton Company and its
waterworks initially enjoyed: the city’s well-respected founding enterprise came to be
perceived as just another greedy corporation.
Though this study recognizes the men who formed the Elyton Land Company as
Birmingham’s foremost early developers, its narrow focus leaves almost no room for
credit to those who deserved it most. The story’s true, unsung heroes are the thousands of
men and women, black and white, who constituted the city’s labor force. Enduring great
hardship for little gain, they provided the sweat and toil that gave form and substance to
the founders’ visions. Without its dynamic labor force, the Magic City of Birmingham
would have remained a dream.

CHAPTER I
ALABAMA’S ALLURE

Soon after General Andrew Jackson’s cadres routed the “Red Stick” Creeks at the
Battle of Horseshoe Bend on 27 March 1814, the Creek nation was dismembered. The
United States government seized over half of its tribal lands as spoils of war, adding
substantially to the federal inventory of ceded Native American territory. Throwing these
newly-conquered lands open to settlement, the federal government spurred a mass
migration into its newly-formed Alabama Territory. “Alabama Fever” swept the nation:
led by veterans of Jackson’s army, tens of thousands of settlers and slaves surged into the
former tribal lands. The first to arrive “. . . selected the best land they could find. They
preferred flat or gently rolling land with fertile soils and with springs or creeks for
drinking water. They also sought access to navigable rivers and quickly staked out the
rich river-bottom lands.”1
Those first afflicted with Alabama Fever gravitated toward the prime agricultural
lands that lay adjacent to the territory’s major rivers. Besides possessing deep, rich
bottomland soils, such tracts were easiest to reach. In a time when there were no paved

1

William Warren Rogers and Robert Daniel Ward and Leah Rawls Atkins and
Wayne Flynt, Alabama: The History of a Deep South State (Tuscaloosa: University of
Alabama Press, 1994), 57.
3

4
roads and few bridges- when men moved about on horses and buckboards- floating
downstream or even poling upstream was vastly preferable to struggling cross-country
along atrocious roads. Although shoals had to be circumvented by portage, and at times
floods or droughts made it difficult or impossible to travel by boat, navigable rivers
nonetheless remained the pioneers’ preferred artery of transport.
The Alabama Territory contained three major river systems, located in two
distinct, separate areas: the Tennessee River valley, which lay in a relatively narrow
swath across the northernmost part of the territory, and the Alabama and Tombigbee river
basins, which sprawled across the territory’s southern coastal plain. (See Figure 1.1).
Sandwiched between them was an uplands region mostly ill-suited for cultivation.
Jutting abruptly from the river bottomlands to the north and south, this elevated middle
part of the territory consisted of wild, rocky, thickly forested hills, ridges, and valleys that
rose northeasterly into Georgia and Tennessee. These “foothills of the Appalachians”
were accessible only by wagon roads and horse trails, and consequently attracted a more
intrepid type of settler, especially small-scale yeoman farmers who could not afford to
buy better land elsewhere.2
While the vast majority of Alabama’s early settlers chose to establish their farms
and homes in the territory’s more accessible riverside lands, a few chose to live in its
remote uplands valleys. One such area- Jones Valley and its environs- attracted more
uplands settlers than any other. Topography was its first appeal: the area lay atop the
2

Leah Rawls Atkins, The Valley and the Hills: An Illustrated History of
Birmingham and Jefferson County (Woodland Hills, CA: Windsor Publications, Inc.,
1981), 13- 18; Rogers, 54- 55.

6
headwaters of two different river systems, on an elevated plain straddled by low
mountains. At its center, a verdant valley about twenty miles long, no more than five
miles wide, tilted slightly from northeast to southwest. From the valley’s upper reaches,
four major creeks flowed west and then north, exiting the valley through mountain gaps
to wind their ways across ten more miles of undulating terrain before emptying into one
of the main tributaries of the Tombigbee River. Adjacent and just east of Jones Valleyon the opposite side of the area’s highest mountain ridge- lay another set of similar
springs and creeks that drained southward into the Cahaba River- a major tributary to the
Alabama River system. (See Figure 1.2). Though it lay far from any sizable river, Jones
Valley had no shortage of water: the surrounding slopes and the valley itself abounded in
gushing springs, whose year-round flows fed networks of clear-running streams. The
land there was truly virgin: its former Native American occupants had used the valley for
hunting, and for gatherings and ceremonies, but not for farming.3 Thanks to the
unspoiled “. . . alluvial soil four major creeks had deposited along their meandering
courses . . . ,”4 Jones Valley’s fertility rivaled that of the state’s best riverside
bottomlands. Recognizing the valley’s productive potential, the first wave of settlers
occupied its best tracts.

3

George M. Cruikshank, A History of Birmingham and Its Environs: A Narrative
Account of Their Historical Progress, Their People, and Their Principal Interests
(Chicago: Lewis Publishing Co., 1920), 92; Atkins, 10- 11.
4

Birmingham Historical Society, Village Creek: An Architectural and Historical
Resources Survey of Ensley, East Birmingham and East Lake; Three Village Creek
Neighborhoods, City of Birmingham (Birmingham, AL: n. p., 1985), 3.

Figure 1.2

Drainage- Jones Valley Area
Black Warrior and Cahaba River Basins
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Only five years after the federal government opened the former Creek Indian lands
to settlement, the Alabama Territory accumulated enough new residents to qualify for
statehood. Not all of those residents counted equally: each white person counted as one
person, but to determine representation in Congress, every five slaves counted as three
people. By this formula, on 14 December 1819, Alabama was admitted to the Union as
its twenty-second state.
Within a year, the population of the new state of Alabama reached 85,451 white
citizens and 41,879 slaves.5 To better accommodate the influx of residents, the Alabama
legislature saw fit to redraw the state’s internal boundaries, carving seven new counties
out of the existing twenty.6 Six of the new counties lay in the southern coastal plain, but
the seventh county- Jefferson County, which included Jones Valley- lay in the northcentral part of the state, squarely in the heart of the ridge-and-valley uplands. (See Figure
1.3). Despite its remoteness, by 1820 Jefferson County had attracted 3,407 white

5

US Census Bureau, “Population by Counties- 1790- 1870, Table II- State of
Alabama," under “Ninth Census- Volume I, The Statistics of the Population of the United
States Embracing the Tables of Race, Nationality, Sex, Selected Ages, and Occupations,
To Which Are Added The Statistics of School Attendance and Illiteracy, of Schools,
Libraries, Newspapers and Periodicals, Churches, Pauperism and Crime, and of Areas,
Families, and Dwellings,” [sic] (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1872),
accessed 20 December 2020, https://www2.census.gov/ library/publications/ decennial/
1870/population/1870a-04.pdf
6

An act to establish certain counties therein named, and for other purposes therein
mentioned [sic], Alabama General Assembly, First Session (December 13, 1819), 50- 57,
accessed 18 November 2020, https://archive.org/details/alabama-acts/1819/page/n49/
mode/2up

10
residents and 707 slaves,7 comprising just under four percent of the state’s white residents
and less than two percent of the state’s slaves.
Migration into Alabama continued apace. Within ten years- by 1830- the state’s
total population more than doubled from 127,901 to 309,527, and nearly doubled again
by 1840 to reach 590,756. Most new residents settled in the state’s riverside
bottomlands, where they grew food staples and cotton- a major cash crop that had
emerged as the linchpin of the state’s economy. Due mainly to its isolation and its
shortage of suitable cotton-growing lands, Jefferson County’s growth was comparatively
sluggish. By 1830 its population had risen to only 5,121 whites and 1,715 slaves.
Between 1830 and 1840, the county’s white population grew by less than seven percent,
while its slave population actually declined by almost five percent.8 After 1840, Jefferson
County’s population plateaued: not until the 1880s would the county exceed one-and-onehalf percent of the state’s total population.
Slow growth was not entirely disadvantageous for Jefferson County: fewer
households meant more water for all. With no nearby big river, the county’s residents
relied solely on springs, creeks, and shallow wells for their water supply. Though springs
were scattered, they were plentiful, which facilitated the settlement of many small farms
and a few plantations. Several groups of early pioneers clustered their homesteads near
the largest springs, giving rise to Jefferson County’s first communities: Jonesboro,
Carrollsville, Ruhamah, Greens, Village Springs, Waldrop’s Mill, Toadvine, Woods

7

8

Atkins, 24.
US Census Bureau, Ninth Census, “Population by Counties, 1790- 1870.”

11
Station, Hagood Springs, Crumly’s Chapel, Avondale Spring, Trussville, and area’s most
populous community, the county seat of Elyton with 300 residents.9 Such growth was
sustainable: as long as the county’s homesteads and communities remained small and
dispersed, springs, creeks, and shallow wells proved sufficient for the population’s wellbeing.
Regardless of its isolation, slow growth, and limited water supply, antebellum
Jefferson County was still part of a vibrant greater whole. All around it, the cotton
economy boomed. Settlers, slaves, materials, and capital continued flowing into the
state’s most productive counties, transforming ever more vacant land into farms and
cotton plantations. Agriculture thrived and trade flourished. Settlements became
villages, villages became towns, and towns became small cities. By these processes, rich
agricultural counties grew richer while rugged uplands counties remained mostly
undeveloped and poor. Amid but yet removed from the full force of the state’s
agricultural economy, Jefferson County seemed destined to remain a backwater. With so
little arable land, there appeared to be no way for the county to generate new wealth or
attract more settlers.
Focused on clearing land, tilling soil, and building homes, Jones Valley’s first
settlers paid scant attention to the low mountain that framed the valley’s southeastern
edge. To them, its peculiar outcroppings of soft, wine-red rock were little more than a
curiosity; hardly worthy of note. To the Native Americans who came before, those red

9

Florence Haskins Wood Moss, Building Birmingham and Jefferson County
(Birmingham: Birmingham Printing Company, 1947), 10- 19; Atkins, 17.

12
rocks had been highly prized as a base material for war paint and dyes. “Even no more
than a slight touch upon it and the hand was turned miraculously to the very color of the
rock.”10
Settler appreciation of the valley’s minerals was slow in coming. Not until the
early 1840s did a Jones Valley resident bother to check and see what the “dye-rock” was
composed of. From a convenient outcrop, Baylis Earle Grace hammered and chiseled
loose a wagon-load of red rock fragments and sent them to a Bibb County forge. His
suspicions were confirmed weeks later when the forge sent back a load of pig-iron ingots
and wrought-iron bars.11 Around that same time, farther north and west in the valley,
settlers discovered thick seams of bituminous coal lying exposed in creek bottoms.
Several entrepreneurs began cutting loose large blocks of coal, loading them onto
flatboats they built out of nearby poplar trees, then floating the loads downstream to sell
in Mobile. Despite having to manhandle the loaded flatboats through creeks and shallow
tributaries until they reached the deeper waters of the Tombigbee- often losing loads
along the way- the creek-bottom coal miners consistently turned a profit.12 Though
modest, these early endeavors proved that Jones Valley iron ore could be transformed into

10

Ethel Armes, The Story of Coal and Iron in Alabama (1910; repr., Leeds, AL:
Beechwood Books, 1987), 10.
11

W. David Lewis, Sloss Furnaces and the Rise of the Birmingham District: An
Industrial Epic (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994), 21; Armes, 46.
12

Michael Tuomey, First Biennial Report on the Geology of Alabama
(Tuskaloosa, AL [sic]: M. D. J. Slade, 1850), 95; Armes, 48; Lewis, 22- 23.

13
useful products, and that Jones Valley coal could be converted into cash. Whether it
made sense to try to exploit these minerals on a grand scale remained to be seen.
Prior to 1850, “. . . the extent of these mineral deposits was only guessed at and
the existence thereof largely ignored.”13 In that year, Alabama State Geologist Michael
Tuomey published his First Biennial Report on the Geology of Alabama, which presented
solid scientific evidence that vast deposits of coal, iron ore, and limestone- all of
acceptable purity- lay embedded in the strata beneath Jefferson County. Although a few
forward-thinking individuals grasped the significance of Tuomey’s findings, most of the
state’s successful cotton planters scoffed at the notion of diverting capital and labor from
agriculture to industry. In their view, mines and factories had no place in King Cotton’s
realm. Conversely, advocates of industrialization recognized that great fortunes could be
earned by those willing to accept the risks and shoulder the burdens of developing
Jefferson County’s land and minerals. One such body of entrepreneurs- the Broad River
Group- concluded that it did indeed make sense to exploit those minerals on a grand
scale. For that to happen, they first needed to build a railroad.

13

Patrick Cather, Birmingham Bound: Opinionated and Often Irreverent Essays
on the Fifty Most Important Books About Alabama’s Largest City (Birmingham: Cather
and Brown Books, 1993), 7.

CHAPTER II
VISIONARIES SEED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Colonel Frank Gilmer- a wealthy planter and merchant from Montgomery- led the
Broad River Group’s charge to develop Jones Valley’s minerals. He realized from the
outset that the area’s rutted wagon roads and horse trails were hopelessly inadequate for
the task at hand. With no nearby navigable river, rail was the only transport option for
huge volumes of bulk iron ore and coal. Of equal if not greater importance, railroads
were sure to become major conduits for passengers and general freight, enabling the local
economy to grow in step with ranks of new residents, who would form the nucleus of a
great new industrial city. Driven by this vision, Gilmer embarked on a years-long
campaign to drum up support and funding for a new railroad through Jones Valley.14
After first securing a charter from the state legislature to construct the South and
North Alabama Railroad,15 Gilmer utilized his well-honed political skills to cleverly
manipulate the legislature into paying for the survey of his railroad, as well as its
construction. Blurring the rail line’s identity by calling it the “Alabama Central

14

Wayne Cline, Alabama Railroads (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1997), 28- 29 and 44- 45; Armes, 106- 107; Lewis, 21.
15

[No 434] An Act to incorporate the South and North Alabama Rail Road
Company [sic], Alabama General Assembly, Fourth Biennial Session (17 February 1854),
318- 320, accessed 29 December 2020, https://archive.org/details/alabama-acts-18531854/Acts_1853_ 1854
14

15
Railroad,” Gilmer, his Broad River compatriots, and other interested parties convinced
the legislature to appropriate $10,000 for “. . . a thorough survey of the most practicable
route to connect the Tennessee River with the navigable waters of Mobile Bay, with
reference to the development of the mineral region of the State . . . .”16 To take on this
task, Governor Andrew Moore appointed John T. Milner, a well-respected engineer with
many years experience surveying, building, and managing railroads. After only a few
short months of intense effort, he submitted Milner’s Report to the Governor of Alabama
on the Alabama Central Railroad,17 which resulted in a legislative allocation of $663,135
to begin work on the Alabama Central Railroad.18 Construction commenced soon
thereafter under the leadership of Frank Gilmer, with John Milner as chief engineer.19
Barely had they began to clear rights-of-way and lay track when war broke out at Fort
Sumpter in April, 1861, adding to their efforts a whole new sense of urgency.
Inspired by both patriotism and the profit motive, Frank Gilmer and John Milner
journeyed to Richmond, where they met with Confederate Secretary of War James

16

[No. 2.] An Act To invest and dispose of the Two per cent. Fund. [sic],
Alabama General Assembly, Sixth Biennial Session (February 8, 1858), 7, accessed 29
December 2020, https://archive.org/details/alabama-acts-1857-1858/Acts_1857_1858
17

John T. Milner, Milner’s Report to the Governor of Alabama on the Alabama
Central Railroad (Montgomery: Advertiser Book and Job Steam Press, 1859), 6- 19;
John Stewart, “Planning the Alabama Central RR,” Birmingham Rails website, accessed
8 August 2020, http://bhamrails.info/Milner_report_Gov.htm
18

19

Lewis, 27; Armes, 121; Cather, 10.

Maury Klein, History of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad (1972, repr.,
Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2003), 116; Armes, 123- 124; Lewis, 27;
Cline, 56.

16
Seddon and secured a contract to continue building their railroad northward from Calera
toward Jones Valley. To feed traffic to their railroad while also supporting the
Confederate war effort, Gilmer and Milner formed another company- the Red Mountain
Iron and Coal Company. By late 1863 their Oxmoor furnaces began producing iron, and
their Helena mines began shipping coal. Mule-drawn wagons hauled output from both
facilities to their northernmost railhead, which by 1865 had reached Brock’s Gap, only a
few miles south and east of Jones Valley. Along with their own products, Gilmer and
Milner loaded iron from at least six other blast furnaces into railcars at Brock’s Gap for
shipment south to the Confederate arsenal at Selma.20 (See Figure 2.1). In spite of
torturous curves, steep grades, and rickety hodgepodge track, in sixteen months their rail
line (once again being identified as the South and North Alabama Railroad) carried
dozens, if not a few hundred railcar loads of iron and coal southward from Brock’s Gap to
its junction with the Alabama & Tennessee River Railroad at Calera. All operations
ceased in late March, 1865, when Federal cavalry raiders arrived in the area and began
destroying furnaces, mines, and railroads.21
After Lee’s surrender on 9 April 1865, chaos reigned throughout Alabama and the
defeated South. Thousands upon thousands of the Confederacy’s young men lay dead,
leaving behind their widows and fatherless children. Ravages of war were evident
everywhere. The very framework of Southern society had disintegrated: the plantation

20

Joseph H. Woodward II, Alabama Blast Furnaces, (1940; repr., Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 2007), 46, 83, 90, 98, 105, 126; Armes, 161- 162, 185- 186;
Cline, 56; Lewis, 34- 35; Rogers, 196; Atkins, 46- 47.
21

Cline, 62.

18
system could no longer exist. Slaves were now freedmen: no longer tied to the land, they
came and went as they pleased, with no fear of being pursued and prosecuted as fugitives.
Unlike before, freedmen required compensation for their labor. Paying in cash was nearimpossible: with almost no greenbacks and little specie in circulation, (Confederate
currency was worthless), planters rarely had money to pay wages. For these and other
reasons, agricultural productivity plummeted. People went hungry while foodstuffs rotted
on the vine. Cotton went unharvested. Fields lay untilled and unseeded. “Land worth
$50 an acre in 1860 would bring only $3 to $5 in 1865.”22 Rich planters who formerly
measured their wealth in slaves and land were ruined. Many yeoman farmers were
rendered destitute. Emancipated slaves- illiterate, with no means of their own- helplessly
gravitated to towns and cities, hoping to find food, shelter, and protection from
rampaging white vigilantes. Federal armies of occupation maintained a semblance of
order while black and white Southerners adapted to their new ways of life.23
Amid this turmoil, entrepreneurs from all walks of life sought to carve out
fortunes for themselves. Opportunists from the Northern states- “carpetbaggers”- began
roaming the state’s corridors of power, turning postwar upheaval to their full advantage.
They were augmented by native Alabamian opportunists- “scalawags”- who had been
Unionists during the war and were Republicans like their Yankee counterparts. By
combining forces with newly enfranchised freedmen, carpetbaggers and scalawags

22

Atkins, 42.

23

Rogers, 225- 230.

19
formed a Radical Republican coalition that dominated the state legislature. Once in
power, they immediately set about lining their pockets with funds from the public purse.
Such tendencies were so widespread as to be nearly commonplace. Throughout
America- in Montgomery and in most other state capitals- corporate agents used fat
bankrolls to manipulate legislative, executive, and judicial deliberations. Their efforts
were all too seldom rebuffed, even at the top levels of government. As evidenced by the
scandal-wracked Grant administration, a distressingly high number of government
officials- both elected and appointed- used their offices mainly for personal gain:
defending the public interest ranked a distant second to satiating their lust for wealth.24
Alabama’s new slate of legislators was no different: its ranks were rife with
corruption. Like crooked politicians in state houses across America, Alabama’s
carpetbaggers and scalawags soon realized that establishing new railroads was an
excellent way to fatten their wallets. Without approaching the colossal scale of the
recently completed transcontinental railroad and the Credit Mobilier scandal it spawned,
the grant of privileges to railroads proved lucrative to government officials who chose to
peddle their influence and sell their votes. The general public understood this fact all too
well: building railroads “. . . had become synonymous with graft and the corrupt
collaboration of businessmen and politicians.”25
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Legislators earned their railroad bribes by issuing land grants and charters,
awarding franchises, and authorizing bond issues. These graft-induced political processes
enabled the state’s postwar rail network to expand swiftly, while also allowing- even
encouraging- clever charlatans to hatch scheme after fraudulent scheme. Railroads, real
and imagined, soon crisscrossed the state. Unscrupulous deal-makers discovered that
authorized funds could easily be diverted during all three phases of railroading: finance,
construction, and operation.26 The irresistible lure of easy money- seemingly there for the
taking- corrupted men at all levels of public responsibility, up to and including the State
Governor.
Operating under these conditions, the Broad River Group beat the charlatans at
their own game and ushered not one but two railroads into Jones Valley. One of the
railroads approaching Jones Valley was the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad. As the
product of a carpetbagger-inspired merger between two unfinished antebellum railroads,
its chief stated goal was to construct and operate a 294-mile-long rail line linking
Meridian, Mississippi to Chattanooga, Tennessee, by a route that diagonally traversed the
full width of north Alabama.27 In December, 1870, the Alabama and Chattanooga had
two crews building their line: one working northeasterly from Meridian, and the other
working southwesterly from Chattanooga. Within a matter of weeks the two work crews
met, and shortly thereafter trains began running through Jones Valley.
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The other railroad being built toward Jones Valley was Gilmer and Milner’s South
and North Alabama Railroad. By the end of December, 1870, they had completed their
line between Montgomery and Calera, and were rebuilding their prewar route between
Calera and Brock’s Gap. From Brock’s Gap, their next step was to extend their line
across Shades Valley, then cut through Grace’s Gap to emerge into Jones Valley. From
there, they would continue building northward through difficult, mountainous terrain until
they reached the rail junctions and the Tennessee River at Decatur. (See Figure 2.2).
Cordial at first, relations between the owners of the two approaching railroads
soon soured. When pressed, the Alabama and Chattanooga’s owners made no secret of
their plan to stifle the development of a manufacturing base in Jones Valley. To that end,
they threatened to seize ownership of the South and North Alabama Railroad, scotch the
line’s extension to Decatur, and ship all the area’s raw materials to their affiliated ironmaking facilities in Chattanooga.28 Milner and Gilmer were aghast. Rapidly recovering
from their initial shock, they soon retaliated by hatching a clever scheme.
In a strategic coup, Milner juggled events and railroad construction timetables
until it fell solely to his purview to select the precise location in Jones Valley where the
South and North Alabama Railroad would intersect with the Alabama and Chattanooga
Railroad. After a complex shuffling of land options, Josiah Morris- a Montgomery
banker and a friend of Gilmer and Milner- purchased 4,150 acres of land surrounding the
soon-to-be railroad junction. Later that same day- 8 December 1870- Morris joined with
nine other of Gilmer and Milner’s wealthy friends to found a new corporation: the Elyton
28
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Land Company, whose chief goal was to build a great new industrial city on its thousands
of newly-acquired acres of empty fields, forest, and brush. After much debate, on 27
January 1871, company shareholders voted to name their new city “Birmingham,” in
honor of the great iron-making city in England.29
Though the future city center lay in friendly hands, Gilmer and Milner’s South
and North Alabama Railroad still faced the threat of a hostile takeover by the Alabama
and Chattanooga Railroad. That scheme was foiled when James W. Sloss- another of
Gilmer and Milner’s friends and allies- came to the rescue. Sloss- a native Alabamian
who had been building railroads in Alabama and Tennessee since the 1850s- was
President of the Nashville and Decatur Railroad. He enjoyed close, friendly relations
with the Louisville & Nashville Railroad- at the time by far the strongest railroad in the
South. In common cause, both railroads had long sought to establish a direct rail link
between the Ohio River and the Gulf of Mexico. Gilmer and Milner’s dilemma was for
Sloss a golden opportunity. He immediately alerted Albert Fink- general superintendent
of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad- that the route they coveted could now be had.

He [Sloss] offered to lease the Nashville and Decatur Railroad to the L&N
for thirty years if the Kentucky road would take up the South & North’s
hypothecated bonds, pay the interest on them, and complete work on the
67-mile gap [closer to 83 miles] between Birmingham and Decatur. The
L&N could then operate the two Alabama roads as one line. It would have

29
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the better part of a through route to the Gulf, and a potentially tremendous
local business from the [Jefferson County] mineral district.30

Fink and his stockholders agreed to Sloss’s plan. They purchased the bonds and absorbed
the South and North Alabama Railroad into the Louisville & Nashville system.31 (See
Figure 2.3).
By affiliating with the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, Gilmer, Milner, and Sloss
initiated a surge of out-of-state capital into local industrial development. Better yet, they
gained a rich and well-managed corporate ally, whose desire to develop Jefferson
County’s land and minerals was as strong as their own. From close by, still more capital
gushed in. Based largely on the assurance that their vacant Jones Valley property would
soon be served by two long-haul railroads, the Elyton Land Company’s ten original
shareholders mobilized their resources to build a city centered on the railroads’ junction.
Together, these railroad and real estate enterprises formed a union of people and
interests with enough power, influence, and capital to steer the fledgling city of
Birmingham, Alabama along a path of rapid growth. Orienting their efforts toward
different but related objectives- building a city and expanding a railroad network- the
Elyton Land Company and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad began formulating plans
to make the most of their investments in Jones Valley and Jefferson County.
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CHAPTER III
THE NEW CITY TAKES SHAPE

The Elyton Land Company’s first task was to organize itself and prepare for
action. After electing five directors, the shareholders chose Colonel James R. Powell as
the company’s first President, and W. A. Allen as its first Secretary and Treasurer.
Possessed of a “lively and energetic” personality, Powell was well-known and wellrespected, with a resume that included being a Pony Express rider, owner of a stagecoach
line, a land speculator, a cotton planter, and a member of Alabama legislature.32 Far less
accomplished than Powell, W. A. Allen’s chief skill was bookkeeping. To round out the
management staff, Powell hired Major William P. Barker to survey and map the new city.
In March, 1871, under the direction of Powell and Barker, teams of surveyors began
staking out the new city’s avenues and streets, aligning them in a grid based on the
orientation of the “Railroad Reservation” at the city center.33 (See Figure 3.1).
While Colonel Powell and Major Barker designed, surveyed, and mapped the city,
track construction continued apace. At long last, on Wednesday, 17 May 1871, the
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Alabama & Chattanooga’s northbound “Lightning Train” passed through Birmingham.
Beginning its historic run in New Orleans, the train took only twenty-six and one-half
hours to reach Chattanooga, thereby opening a new route that shortened the travel time
between New York and New Orleans by six hours. The route proved popular, and within
weeks the Alabama & Chattanooga began running five to six trains a day through
Birmingham.34
Thanks to the competence of their engineers, surveyors, and draftsmen, the Elyton
Land Company was able to begin selling lots on 1 June 1871, just two weeks after the
first Alabama and Chattanooga train passed through town. Sales were brisk, even though
the company required purchasers of lots “. . . to improve the lot to the extent of $500.00
in value of improvements for every $100.00 of price of lot. . . .” [sic]35 Trains kept
coming one after another, day after day, each one disgorging dozens of fortune-seekers
and prospective residents.
Every lot the Elyton Land Company sold had to be documented. The task of
keeping records current and correct soon overwhelmed Secretary- Treasurer Allen, who
fell ill and resigned. Learning of the vacant office, Major Willis Julian Milner applied for
the job. His qualifications and character were remarkable: in addition to his expertise in
railroading, W. J. Milner was a bonafide Confederate war hero and a true leader of men.
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For most gentlemen of the time, the title of “Captain” or “Major” or even “Colonel” was
honorary; but not for Milner, who actually served as a Major in the Confederate Army of
Tennessee. His title was earned, and paid for in blood: as a veteran of many fierce
engagements, he was thrice wounded in battle. After enlisting as a private in 1861,
Milner rose through the ranks to earn his officer’s commission. As a Lieutenant he was
placed in command of Company K of the 33rd Alabama Infantry Regiment. As a Captain
he was appointed adjutant on General Mark Lowery’s brigade staff. Just before the war’s
end he was promoted to Major and given command of the 1st Alabama Infantry
Regiment.36 Along with his well-proven executive ability and his solid background in
bookkeeping and engineering, Major Milner was worthy of even more trust due to his
family ties: he was John T. Milner’s cousin37 as well as the son-in-law of Dr. Henry
Caldwell- one of the Elyton Land Company’s ten original stockholders. After making
“due inquiries,” Powell hired Milner on 25 July 1871, thereby launching a distinguished
career that lasted nearly thirty years. To no one’s surprise, from his first to his last days
with the company and its offshoot enterprises- especially the waterworks- Major Milner
proved himself to be extraordinarily talented and capable.38
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In September, 1871, soon after W. J. Milner settled into his new job as company
Secretary- Treasurer, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad added to the pace and flow of
city traffic by opening its rail line to Montgomery. Spurred on by the new rail route to the
south, Birmingham continued to grow swiftly but unevenly. Demand for essential goods
and services far outstripped supply: from the start, new residents and businesses did their
best to overcome persistent shortages of boarding houses, hotel accommodations, and
building materials. Powell did what he could to alleviate them: by offering incentives, he
convinced two brickmakers to set up shop amid the frames of the city’s rising structures.
At Powell’s urging, on 1 September 1871 the Elyton Land Company directors voted to
allocate $7,000 to help pay for the city’s first hotel, which Powell had already begun
building.39 Less obvious but more crucial was the growing strain placed upon the local
water supply, which at the time was nothing more than a loose collection of springs and
wells; at best sufficient for a small town. Recognizing all these and many other problems,
the Elyton Land Company and its dynamic staff did its best to solve them all.
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CHAPTER IV
PRIVATE INDUSTRY, PUBLIC WATER

Birmingham officially became a city when the state legislature approved its
charter on 19 December 1871.40 Acting on a list of nominees provided by the Elyton
Land Company, that same day Governor Robert Lindsay appointed Birmingham’s first
mayor and aldermen. As specified by the city’s charter, those nine men were to hold
office until the city’s first elections, to be held in January, 1873. So, for Birmingham’s
first formative year of existence, the Elyton Land Company’s hand-picked officials
managed affairs at City Hall.
Nudged by their backers, Mayor Robert Henley and his eight Alderman applied
for and quickly received additional municipal powers. On 26 February 1872, the
legislature authorized the City of Birmingham to “. . . establish and erect gas works for
lighting the city with gas, and water works for supplying said city with water . . . .”41 If
the City did not itself wish to engage in providing those public services, it was authorized
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to contract with third parties to do so.42 Short and to the point, the empowering Act did
not address funding of these public works. Nonetheless, the Act did grant to the city
government the overarching right to decide how those services would be delivered.
The city’s need for a waterworks- and to a lesser extent a gasworks- grew ever
more pressing. By March, 1872, Birmingham’s population reached 800, with about 125
houses, of which seventeen were brick, along with one hotel (The Relay House) and
about forty wood-frame stores.43 With each passing month, more and more people,
horses, and buildings crowded the city; a testament to the success of the advertising blitz
being conducted by President Powell, whose commanding presence and tireless efforts to
promote the city earned him the sobriquet “Duke of Birmingham.” Powell’s campaign to
lure people and industry to Birmingham was beginning to work all too well: by the
Summer of 1872 the volume of newcomers overwhelmed the community’s ability to
accommodate them.
As the hot days of May and June set in, drinking water came to be the most acute
shortage of all. Vendors began filling barrels with water from Avondale Spring and other
nearby springs, hauling cartloads of barrels two or more miles to sell downtown, often at
the highest price the market would bear.44 Though they sufficed to meet the public’s
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immediate need, cartloads of barrels supplied enough drinking water for only a few
hundred residents. To adequately serve a population of thousands, an exponentially
greater volume of water would be required on a daily basis. That could be accomplished
only by the construction of a waterworks; a task that the legislature specifically left to the
discretion of Birmingham’s city government.
The critical need for a waterworks was underscored on 4 July 1872 when
Birmingham experienced its first major fire. Bucket brigades were to no avail: all the
buildings at Third Avenue North and Twentieth Street- which included a “drug house,” a
tinner’s shop, and the city’s first dry goods store- burned to the ground.45 As property
owners clamored for effective fire protection, the city government and the Elyton Land
Company redoubled their efforts to provide it.
In the Summer of 1872, the government of the City of Birmingham had been in
existence for only a few months. As a political body struggling to stand on its shaky legs,
the Mayor and Aldermen could muster neither the means nor the resources to build a
waterworks. They did, however, possess “. . . the power and authority to contract with
any person or association of persons or corporation to . . . supply said city with water.”46
Quite naturally, the Mayor and Aldermen looked first to the Elyton Land Company.
Company President Powell had no desire to enter into the business of providing
water to the city. But clearly, someone had to, and fast. So, Powell began looking for a
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qualified third party to build and manage a city waterworks.47 After weeks of searching,
he found no one willing to invest money in the project, and was forced to conclude that if
a waterworks was going to be built for Birmingham, the Elyton Land Company would
have to build it. With that decision made, Powell refocused his search: he quit chasing
after investors and began looking for a waterworks construction specialist.
Soon thereafter, Powell hired an engineer named Travers Daniels to design a
waterworks for the City. Aided greatly by Major Barker’s survey data and maps, Daniels
took only a few weeks to formulate and sketch a plan for Birmingham’s first waterworks.
With Powell’s approval, Daniels submitted the proposal to the city government. Well
aware that Daniels’ waterworks plan was backed by the Elyton Land Company, on 25
September 1872 Birmingham’s Mayor and Aldermen granted Daniels the right to build
it.48 Later that same day, the Elyton Land Company directors voted to accept the transfer
of the waterworks agreement just made between Daniels and the City, and to employ
Daniels at the salary of $200 per month to oversee construction of the waterworks.49
By this flurry of agreements, the infant City of Birmingham- through the vehicle
of Travers Daniels- granted the Elyton Land Company the non-exclusive right to build a
waterworks, along with the right to operate the system for twenty years; after which time
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the city would have the right to purchase it. The agreements did not specify where the
city’s water would come from, or how it would be delivered; they did, however, list in
detail several means by which the waterworks could generate profits for its owners.
Substantial savings were built in: most significantly, the waterworks and all its
property were free from city taxation. Also, the city agreed to grant rights-of-way for
water pipelines free of charge. Further, the city committed to pay for the installation of
fire hydrants, and to pay an annual rental fee for each hydrant. Of utmost importance to
waterworks revenues, the city approved an elaborate “Tariff of Water Rates,” along with
attendant rules and regulations, skewed heavily in favor of the waterworks owner.50 (See
Appendix A). With these assurances of cost savings and revenue generation, the Elyton
Land Company set about fulfilling its contractual obligation to “. . . proceed immediately
to construct and put in operation said Water Works and to use all due diligent [sic] to
complete the same at the earliest possible moment. . . .”51
The agreement’s urgent language reflected the public’s pressing need. To ensure
that the citizens of Birmingham would soon have a ready supply of water for drinking and
fighting fires, the people’s representatives (who were hand-picked by the Elyton Land
Company and appointed, not elected, to their offices) awarded their backers with a
lucrative franchise. Though the Elyton Land Company committed to spend tens of
thousands of dollars of its own private capital to build the waterworks, over the twentyyear duration of the agreement, the company’s owners and managers felt sure they would

50

Ibid, 20- 22 and 73- 83.

51

Ibid, 21.

35
profit handsomely. Besides providing for the public good, building the waterworks
would enable the city to keep growing. Strong growth meant brisk sales of company real
estate, at higher prices due to enhanced values from waterworks service. Better yet,
selling water under favorable terms to an ever-growing number of households,
businesses, and industries endowed the company with a potentially huge new stream of
revenue.
During the last days of 1872, construction of the Elyton Land Company’s
waterworks was well underway. On the upside of the endeavor, each passing day of work
brought the system that much closer to completion. On the downside, cash was flowing
out as through a sieve; until the waterworks was finished, there would be no revenue from
water sales.
Though nowhere near enough to offset waterworks construction costs, a new
source of revenue began flowing into company coffers in December, 1872, when- amid
much fanfare- the Elyton Land Company opened the doors to its new thirty-room hotel.
Located adjacent to the railroad station and a block from the city’s first bank, the new
hotel and restaurant- named “The Relay House”- became a gathering place for
businessmen and the main social hub of the city’s well-to-do.52
By February, 1873, Birmingham’s population swelled to about 4,000- a five-fold
increase in just one year. The new residents occupied about 500 new houses- fifty-four of
which were two-story brick or stone- and frequented 125 wood-frame stores, six
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churches, two public mills, four hotels, several boarding houses and restaurants, several
small manufacturing operations, and a national bank,53 along with more than a few
saloons and brothels. Thanks to the city’s explosive growth, for most of 1872 the Elyton
Land Company fared well financially. Shareholders expected the happy days to continue,
which they did for the first few months of 1873, though not to the same extent as before:
the red-hot real estate market cooled and the tide of migrants to Birmingham subsided.
Success in city-building gave rise to political boons. In the January, 1873 city
elections- Birmingham’s first- the people elected James R. Powell as their Mayor, and
John T. Milner as one of their eight Alderman. A few weeks later, another of the
company’s political campaigns met with success when the citizens of Jefferson County
held a referendum and voted to move the county seat from Elyton to Birmingham. By
that victory, the bustling brand-new city of Birmingham solidly eclipsed the nearby
pioneer-era town of Elyton.
As the Elyton Land Company’s political fortunes grew brighter, so too did its
prospects for industrial development in and around Birmingham. Two long-time alliesthe aging but still-sharp Daniel Pratt, along with his ward Henry Fairchild DeBardeleben
(who Pratt treated as a son)- purchased controlling interests in Gilmer and Milner’s Red
Mountain Iron and Coal Company, renamed it the Eureka Mining and Transportation
Company, and set about bringing the old prewar Oxmoor furnaces back into blast. John
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Milner founded a new company- the Newcastle Coal and Iron Company- which soon
began shipping seventy tons of coal per day.54
While local businessmen began extracting and processing area minerals,
entrepreneurs from far and wide began viewing Birmingham, Jones Valley, and Jefferson
County as worthy of consideration for their investment dollars. Intent on maintaining and
enhancing that level of investor interest, the Elyton Land Company redoubled its efforts
to finish its waterworks, which it knew to be the key to any further residential,
commercial, or industrial development.
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CHAPTER V
PEAKS OF TRIUMPH, VALLEYS OF DESPAIR

The waterworks began with digging. Lots of digging; both for giant holes in the
ground to contain a pond and a reservoir, and for miles of long, narrow trenches to house
water pipelines. Some thought the work entertaining:

There was not much amusement for the young folks of that day so Sunday
afternoons we would make up a party of six or perhaps a dozen and stroll
out to see the new reservoir that was to contain the muddy water of Village
Creek for our consumption . . . .55

Aside from giving bored youth a novel way to kill time, the Elyton Land Company’s
excavations made it clear to the general public that something was being done about the
city’s severe water shortage. Though locals perceived it as a colossal undertaking,
Birmingham’s first waterworks unfolded according to Travers Daniels’ relatively simple
and straightforward plan. (See Figure 5.1). His design called for drawing water directly
from Village Creek, at a point about two miles due north of the city center. Via an inlet
set into the creek’s south bank, raw creek water flowed into an adjacent holding pond. As
the heaviest suspended particles of mud settled to the bottom of the holding pond’s still
waters, a Worthington steam engine with a capacity of 500,000 gallons per day pumped
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somewhat-less-muddy water through an 0.82 mile-long pipeline to a 1,000,000 gallon
“service reservoir” located on top of a hill overlooking the city. After more of the
suspended solid particles settled to the bottom of the hilltop service reservoir, almostclear water flowed by gravity through a 1.41 mile-long pipeline to the city center. The
system as first built contained about 2.23 miles of eight-inch-diameter water mains and
1.16 miles of distribution pipelines varying in diameter from six inches down to one inch,
for service to individual businesses and residences, and perhaps more importantly, to fire
hydrants. Once completed, its builders believed the new waterworks would be more than
adequate for all the city’s needs. As W. J. Milner later noted, Travers Daniels’ layout was
“. . . many years in advance of its requirements.”56
Construction of the waterworks was a laborious, time-consuming, and expensive
undertaking. To build the reservoir, scores of hand laborers with picks and shovels dug
up hundreds of thousands of cubic feet of soil and rock, which they hauled away in
wheelbarrows and mule-drawn carts; a process that took over six months. Concurrent
with that effort, work crews laid 3.39 miles of water pipelines, which were composed of
hundreds of pipe sections purchased from distant manufacturers and transported by rail to
Birmingham. To set the pipelines in place, laborers excavated trenches a few dozen feet
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at a time. Other crews loaded pipe sections onto mule-drawn carts, which they drove
from railroad sidings to open trenches. Workers manhandled each pipe section into
place, then coupled each one to its adjacent pipe sections. After securing the couplings,
workers covered the completed pipeline, tamped down the soil, and moved on to the next
open trench section.
By these processes, month after month the dug holes of the service reservoir and
the holding pond grew broader and deeper while the pipeline trenches extended farther
and farther. Midway through the project, construction crews began work on buildings to
house the Worthington steam engine and its ancillary equipment. Together with the
adjacent holding pond, these creekside facilities were named the “North Birmingham
Pumping Station.” As the sprawling waterworks system continued to come together, the
community eagerly anticipated its grand opening.
While the waterworks took shape, the legislature passed three Acts that had a
profound effect on Birmingham. Voted into law on 15 March 1873, Act No. 276 took
just over three pages to bestow upon the Mayor and Aldermen no fewer than forty-one
specific powers of government. Following the pattern established for other Alabama
cities, these included the power to levy and collect property taxes, the authorization to
issue bonds for city improvements, and the right to regulate or prohibit everything from
railroad steam whistles to “houses of ill fame.” Beyond their explicit grants of power, the
legislature also authorized the Mayor and Aldermen to “. . . pass all such other ordinances
and by-laws of whatever kind and upon whatever subject they shall deem fit and proper
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for the good government of said city . . . .”57 Armed with all these tools, Mayor Powell
and his Aldermen began crafting the framework of a strong and effective municipal
government.
Less than two weeks later, the legislature passed Act No. 314, which granted a
municipal corporate charter to Birmingham’s first professional firefighting organization,
the Pioneer Fire Company No. 1. The fire company was entitled to have up to seventyfive members, who would all be exempt from militia service, jury duty, and street
maintenance. Should the company neglect their duties or “. . . cease to be efficient . . . ,”
the Mayor and Alderman were authorized to revoke its charter.58
Three weeks after creating the Pioneer Fire Company, the legislature amended the
Elyton Land Company’s charter by passing Act No. 321.59 This short Act- less than one
page- authorized the Elyton Land Company “. . . to contract for and hold property and
water works for the use of the city of Birmingham, and for the lands and property of said
Elyton Land Company; . . .” indicating that the legislature fully expected the company to
serve both the public and itself. To further encourage the application of private capital to
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the public good, the legislature granted the Elyton Land Company a blanket authorization
similar to the one just granted to the City. By decreeing that the company was “. . . freely
authorized to engage in such other works of improvement not already authorized by its
charter . . . ,” Act No. 321 invited the Elyton Land Company to build a gasworks, or to
establish any other enterprise through which their company’s investment would benefit
the public.
By the time the legislature granted these sweeping powers, the Elyton Land
Company’s finances had stretched to the breaking point. To raise the $60,000 they
estimated would be required to build the waterworks, “. . . the company had executed
sundry notes maturing at short intervals, hoping to realize from the sale of lots a sufficient
amount to meet them. . . .”60 Alas, this was not to be. Beginning in the Spring of 1873, a
national economic downturn caused lot sales to abruptly decline. Revenues plummeted.
The company’s ability to pay the notes coming due was cast very much in doubt.
Making no mention of the Elyton Land Company’s precarious financial state,
President/ Mayor Powell was at the forefront of the 4 May 1873 celebration, when the
valves were at last opened and water began flowing from Village Creek to downtown
Birmingham.61 The first customer to receive water from the new system was the Elyton
Land Company’s own Relay House Hotel.62 Extensions were available to those of the
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city’s proprietors and homeowners whose businesses and residences were located beside
a distribution pipeline- provided they paid in advance for their connection and agreed to
abide by all thirty-two of the waterworks’ rules and regulations. As first laid out, the
waterworks served only a narrow swath of properties through the city. Homes and
businesses not immediately adjacent to distribution lines had no choice but to continue
relying on wells, springs, and water vendors.
Events in Birmingham took a drastic turn for the worse on 12 June 1873, when a
man identified as “Mr. Y,” newly arrived from Huntsville, was diagnosed as having
cholera. He died the next day. No other cases occurred until 17 June, when two young
girls died from cholera. More citizens were stricken with the disease two days later, and
still more the day after that. By then it was obvious that the community was in the grip of
an especially virulent strain of cholera: the number of infected people kept climbing, and
almost everyone who got sick died within twenty-hours. People began fleeing the city;
hundreds left by the end of the month. On 1 July, a city-wide epidemic was declared.
(See Figure 5.2).
Ignoring the edict that every citizen do all they could to prevent the spread of the
disease, on 4 July a party of about two hundred Birmingham citizens took a day-trip
excursion to the Blount Springs resort, located near the Louisville & Nashville Railroad
about thirty miles north of the city. After spending the day “. . . eating, drinking, dancing
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&c. . . ,” the party returned to Birmingham about 8:00 that evening. Before the sun rose
the next morning, seven members of the excursion party died of cholera.63
As the well-to-do suffered and died from their carefree behavior, joyless
homebound citizens of modest means met with same fate. Cholera roared through the
slum known as “Baconsides,” which consisted of “. . . a number of shanties and negro
cabins, low, dirty and ill ventilated . . . .” Located a mile west of the city center, just
downstream from the convergence of several small creeks, the Baconsides shanties lined
the north edge of a “. . . low, marshy ravine . . .” that the creeks’ combined flow had
carved into the valley floor. Baconsides backyards formed the perfect breeding ground
for the cholera bacterium, and became the epicenter of one of the city’s worst outbreaks.64

By each rain-fall the filth of all kinds which covered the ground around
these cabins was washed into the ravine, and it was from a low spring and
a number of barrels sunk in the marshy bottom of this ravine that the
inhabitants of Baconsides and many of the white residents of Birmingham
obtained their drinking water.65

Another of the hardest-hit areas was the city center itself. Three public wells in the area
between Nineteenth and Twenty-First Streets, and First and Second Avenue North, were
contaminated, and caused dozens of deaths. A close inspection of one revealed why:
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The well at Second Avenue and Nineteenth Street was the Mecca for the
thirsty for blocks around, while farmers from far and near slaked their
thirst from the old oaken bucket which hung from the spindle. When the
epidemic appeared the health authorities became suspicious of this well
and caused it to be cleaned out, with results that interested- and nauseatedthe community. Tin cans, broken crockery, decaying pieces of rope and
many other articles came to the surface, along with a [dead] cat and a
number of rats.66

In contrast to the city’s hotbeds of contagion, the buildings and people connected to the
new waterworks- including the Elyton Land Company’s Relay House Hotel- remained
free from cholera.67 Fewer lives would have been lost had the waterworks been more
fully built-out:

[The] worst feature of the situation was the water supply. The street mains
of the water works system . . . were almost a negligible quantity; so
incomplete were they, only a few dwellings [were] thus supplied.68

Outside the disease-free, waterworks-served islands, the epidemic peaked, then slowly
subsided until it ceased altogether in mid-August. In its wake, cholera left 128 dead,69
from a city that in the span of a few short weeks had become a shell of its former self.
More than half the population had fled; many never to return.
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Of those 2,000 residents who stayed and endured the ordeal, some set a shining
example for others. Among the most notable was Mayor Powell- the Duke of
Birmingham- who proved himself to be a man of the people; worthy of his constituents’
admiration. “Colonel Powell stood bravely at his post, maintained order and did what he
could for the suffering.”70 Though its residents’ spirits were lifted by hometown heroes
and heroines, the vibrant city became a ghost town. Branded by the stigma of deadly
disease, Birmingham repelled instead of attracted new emigrants. For the city, it seemed
as if things could get no worse.
But then they did. A few weeks after the cholera epidemic ended, Birmingham
was struck by another hammer-blow that sent the city reeling again. This time the trouble
came from afar. In New York and in the capitals of Europe, financial markets swayed,
then toppled into a crisis that became the Panic of 1873. The flashpoint occurred in
September, 1873, when the banking firm of Jay Cooke and Company- one of the world’s
largest speculators in railroad bonds- closed its doors and went bankrupt. Within weeks,
all across America, thousands of business firms, including hundreds of banks and dozens
of railroads followed suit. The New York Stock Exchange closed for ten days. Capital
markets dried up. Factory closings caused unemployment to soar. Those who kept their
jobs did so by accepting wage cuts. Pushed by all these and more cascading events,
America and Europe slid into a years-long depression.
The depression brought many of the nation’s railroads to a standstill, but the
Louisville & Nashville Railroad kept serving Birmingham along the through-route it
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established in September, 1872. Even though traffic fell to a level that warranted only a
single passenger coach a week and just one freight car a day, the trains kept running.71
Distressed by the negligible revenue, Superintendent Albert Fink and other Louisville &
Nashville managers wondered if they would ever recover the millions of dollars they
spent to build the line from Decatur to Montgomery. After two years of heavy losses
from the expansion he so highly touted, Fink resigned on 1 July 1875; his reputation
marred by the failure of the Birmingham mineral district to deliver as advertised.
For the Elyton Land Company and its waterworks, panic and depression brought
calamity. Real estate values plunged and lot sales dwindled to almost nothing. Between
1873 and 1879, income from sales of lots was “. . . barely enough to pay interest and
office expenses. Improved business property sold during this period for less than onefourth of the cost of improvements on it. . . .”72 By its directors’ own reckoning, the
company’s financial state had come to be “embarrassing.” Company managers cut costs
wherever they could, and their brand-new waterworks was among the first of their
operations to feel the pinch.
In their 21 November 1873 director’s meeting, the Board accepted President
Powell’s offer to forego his salary. To further cut costs, the Board then voted to
discontinue waterworks Superintendent Travers Daniels’ salary, and instead pay him “. . .
the amount of Current earnings of the Company from Water Rents. . . .” Daniels
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countered by submitting a proposal by which the Company would grant him a ten-year
lease on the waterworks. The Board neither accepted nor rejected Daniels’ proposal;
instead, they voted to refer it to a Convention of Stockholders.73
Three weeks later, on 15 December 1873, President Powell called a special
meeting of the ten largest stockholders, who convened at the Montgomery offices of the
South and North Alabama Railroad Company. The meeting’s purpose was to “. . .
provide ways and means to relieve the Company of its embarrassments resulting from the
investment of money in the Water Works of the City of Birmingham and in the purchase
of lands. . . .”74 Beyond their concerns about the plight of the company, each attendee
was acutely aware of what they personally stood to lose. Under Alabama law, “. . . each
stockholder is personally liable for an amount equal to his stock, should the assets of the
Company fail to pay its liabilities. . . .”75 If the company went bankrupt, each of its
stockholders would suffer debilitating losses. Some might be ruined. After hours of
debate, the off-site strategy session adjourned with no official action taken.
Six weeks later, at the company’s annual stockholders meeting on 29 January
1874, Travers Daniels stepped into the limelight. Following the President’s and
Secretary’s reports, Daniels took the floor and addressed the assembled crowd. He “. . .
read two propositions to lease the Water Works which were referred to the Board of
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Directors. . . .”76 No doubt frustrated by having his proposals batted back and forth
between the company’s directors and stockholders, Daniels did not have to wait much
longer for a decision. At their meeting the following day, the directors turned down both
of his proposals. Demonstrating their recognition of the true value of their waterworks,
the directors voted to retain full control of the system. They resolved that “. . . the water
works shall not be sold . . .” unless there were no other way to satisfy the company’s
debts. The directors then voted to keep Daniels employed as the company’s waterworks
Superintendent, and to continue paying him as before, by allowing him keep the
waterworks “current earnings” in lieu of a salary.77
With waterworks issues as well in hand as they could be- given the circumstancesPresident/ Mayor Powell reignited his campaign to lure emigrants to Birmingham.
Facing an uphill battle due to the economic depression and the lingering public perception
that Birmingham was still rife with disease, Powell and his fellow stockholders knew that
the key to reviving the company’s good fortunes lay in bringing people to Birmingham
and selling them real estate lots and water.
Capitalizing on his good relations with the Alabama Press Association, Powell
convinced that organization to hold its 1874 annual meeting in Birmingham. Invited as
special guests were several members of the New York Press Association, including
editors of The New York Times, America’s leading newspaper. The group’s agenda took
in many of the Birmingham area’s best features, including its brand-new waterworks:
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Wednesday, May 20:
8:00 AM: Members and guests meet at Sublett Hall to travel by carriage
to view outcroppings of red iron ore on Red Mountain, thence to the Water
Works on Reservoir Hill and the pumphouse on Village Creek, to the city's
free public schools, railroad shops, foundries, planing mills and other
mechanical industries with the afternoon free to explore the city.
Thursday, May 21:
8:00 AM: Members and guests to meet at railroad depot for special train
to Blount Springs, stopping on the way to visit coal mines along the route,
returning at 6:00 PM.
Friday, May 22:
8:00 AM: Members and guests board another special train bound for the
Eureka Iron Works, Brock's Gap, Cahaba Coal Mines, Helena Rolling
Mills and developments on the route to Montgomery, where the group is
dispersed.78

Reporters and editors who attended were suitably impressed; many wrote glowing reports
of Birmingham’s bright future.
Though the upbeat press coverage helped to restore Birmingham’s image as an
up-and-coming city, Powell’s publicity campaign attracted few new residents to
Birmingham. Disappointed that their latest marketing efforts bore no fruit, the company
retrenched and pondered other ways to cut costs and boost revenues. Once again, the
expensive, sluggishly performing waterworks came under fire.
At the next directors’ meeting on 19 October 1874, Powell announced that
Travers Daniels had agreed to a new deal: for the last quarter of the year, Daniels would
pay all the waterworks operating expenses out of his own pocket, and would keep “. . .
78
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one-half of the gross receipts from water rents. . . .”79 Daniels was present at the 19
October directors meeting, and raised no objection to the altered terms that were for him
far less favorable. His acquiescence was surely influenced by Powell’s recitation of the
company’s grim financial statements, which established that the company simply did not
have the money to pay him any more than they offered.
A month later, the company’s finances hovered even closer to the brink of
disaster. It owed $67,000, with $33,000 in notes coming due on 1 January 1875. Having
mortgaged their new waterworks as security for the outstanding notes, failure to pay on
time would likely result in foreclosure, and the possible consequent loss of the
waterworks. Laying out these facts at another off-site meeting of the largest stockholders,
held at the Montgomery offices of the South and North Alabama Railroad Company on
17 November 1875, the assembled group agreed to issue $80,000 in bonds, secured by a
mortgage on all the Company’s property. The first of the proceeds from bond sales
would be dedicated to paying all the company’s debts.80
Just over two weeks later, at a Convention of Stockholders held at the company’s
Birmingham offices on 3 December 1874, the assembled shareholders concluded that
they had no choice but to endorse the plan and issue the bonds.81 With $33,000 in notes
coming due in less than four weeks, they needed cash fast. Unfortunately, generating
cash from bond sales would take far more time than they had.
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Voting yes for the bond issue was the company’s first step down a long road. Its
next step was toward Montgomery, to appeal to the legislature for authorization to issue
the bonds. Typically it took weeks if not months to secure passage of a simple legislative
Act; during the holiday season the process moved slower. While the political process
unfolded, the company began preparing a mortgage deed to describe the land and property
that would be pledged as security for the bonds. Given the Elyton Land Company’s
extensive holdings, the task took surveyors and attorneys several weeks to complete.
Meanwhile, the company continued to cut costs wherever it could. Even though
Travers Daniels was being paid only one-half of the waterworks current earnings, the
directors ruled even that was too much. Effective 1 January 1875, they dismissed Daniels
and appointed Major W. J. Milner to take over as waterworks supervisor.82 Milner
received no additional compensation for his new title and added responsibilities, but he
did retain his paid position as Secretary and Treasurer of the company.
That same day- 1 January 1875- the Elyton Land Company defaulted on $33,000
in notes payable. Skeptical of reassurances that the bonds sales money was on the way,
impatient lienholders began taking steps to collect. Embarrassment and humiliation
ratcheted to new heights: the company became the object of derision and scorn:

Croakers were not wanting who expressed no hope for the future of the
city, and who hesitated not to ascribe to the Elyton Land Company the
responsibility for all their woes. Bitter feelings toward the Company were
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freely indulged in, and the harshest criticisms were heard on every hand of
the Company, its officials and their management.83

In its regular annual meeting that took place in Birmingham on 28 January 1875,
worried stockholders empowered the company directors to either sell bonds or sell the
waterworks to pay the company’s debts.84 In a reversal of their earlier edict, for the first
time, the stockholders agreed to allow the waterworks to be sold.
Three weeks later, on 19 February 1875, the bonds authorization came through.
By its Act No. 327, the legislature permitted the company to borrow money, mortgage its
property, and issue up to $80,000 worth of ten-year bonds that paid no more than eight
percent interest.85 Salvation was at hand: bonds could now be sold, and debts paid.
Even though their long-sought goal had just been reached, the company’s leader
lost his resolve. Weary of the high pressures and heavy responsibilities of his offices,
disheartened that the public held the company in such low esteem, at the 3 March 1875
director’s meeting, James R. Powell resigned as President of the Elyton Land Company.
After serving the few remaining months of his term as Mayor of Birmingham, he retired
from public life.

83

Caldwell, 12.

84

ELC Minutes, 41.

85

No.327.] AN ACT To amend section one of an act entitled “An act to amend
section one of the charter of the Elyton Land Company, in Jefferson county, incorporated
under the general laws of the State.” [sic] General Assembly of Alabama, Session of
1874- 5 (19 February 1875), 483- 485.

56
To serve in Powell’s place, the Board of Directors unanimously elected Dr. H. M.
Caldwell to be the Elyton Land Company’s new President. Soon afterward, on 30 March
1875, President Caldwell called his first meeting, for the purpose of presenting to the
stockholders the finished mortgage deed, along with 160 freshly printed $500 bonds. The
documents were quickly approved, and a drive to sell bonds got underway immediately.
Problems arose almost at once when no one could be persuaded to buy the bonds.
Worse yet, all but one of the lienholders refused to accept the new bonds as payment for
the company’s debts. One lienholder- William H. Woodward- proved especially difficult
to satisfy, turning down three different proposals to settle his debt: he refused to accept
payment in bonds discounted by twenty percent, or in land at its then-current depressed
value, or in company stock at $50 per share.86 Rejecting all those proposals made it clear
that Woodward intended to foreclose on the debt and take over the company’s
waterworks. By insights gleaned from a jilted Elyton Land Company manager, he was
led to view that outcome as a distinct possibility.
Though no longer part of the company’s management, Travers Daniels remained
involved in its intrigues. As evidenced by the frankness and trust expressed in his 15
May 1875 letter of reply to Joseph Hershey Woodward, (see Appendix B), Travers
Daniels felt that he had become close friends with the wealthy Woodward family of
Wheeling, West Virginia. He was not ashamed to share news of his recent ill-fortune:
while traveling through Pennsylvania and Virginia, calling on various public entities,
trying to secure a contract to design and build a gas works or a water works, he found
86
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himself with “. . . only 4 cents in my pocket . . . .” [sic] Having no funds to pay his hotel
bill, he “. . . drew on the Co [sic] for money . . .” to settle with the proprietor and make
his way home to Birmingham. “This explains why I did not come to Wheeling which I
have long most earnestly desired to do,” said Daniels, indicating that he had never been to
Wheeling, but making no mention of an outstanding invitation from the Woodwards to
visit them there.87
Departing from his personal woes, Daniels spent the final two pages of his letter
sharing insider information. “At your request, I send you the list of stockholders . . . ,” he
began, following with a list of eleven names and his assessment of their collective state of
mind. “. . . I think all the stockholders look upon their enterprise as a failure, as far as
they are concerned. . . .” [sic] Daniels then countered that perception by saying “. . . I
think that the importance of the place as a site for the manufacture of cheap iron, or of
cotton, that it has no superior . . . .” After more opining about the ill-management of the
Elyton Land Company’s affairs, Daniels concluded his letter by saying “. . . It is needless
to inform you that I feel outraged at the way in which the Co have treated you. . . .”88
Daniels’ thoughts and observations had special meaning to the Woodwards.
Though they lived far from Birmingham, the Woodward family was a powerful force in
the local economy, and had been since 1869, when their patriarch, Stimson Harvey
Woodward, traveled South and purchased thousands of acres of mineral lands in
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Jefferson and Tuscaloosa counties. The family wisely decided to delay the development
of their Alabama mineral lands until economic conditions improved,89 but in the
meanwhile they invested in several other local enterprises, favoring those recommended
by their man on the scene, Travers Daniels.
During the twenty-five months that Daniels was the waterworks Superintendent,
the Woodward family loaned the Elyton Land Company at least $30,000. Stimson’s son
William H. Woodward (referred to familiarly by Daniels as “Will”) “. . . loaned the
company $15,000 secured by a mortgage on the water works. . . .”90 When the Elyton
Land Company failed to pay the note on time, W. H. Woodward began taking steps to
foreclose, take over the waterworks, and perhaps rehire Travers Daniels as its
Superintendent. But that was not to be, for “. . . at this juncture, three stockholders,
Josiah Morris, James W. Sloss, and H. M. Caldwell, paid the note, taking in lieu of it
some of the company’s bonds . . .”91 Several months later, on 21 September 1875, the
Company settled another debt to Woodward, who by that time was willing to accept
payment in Company bonds discounted by twenty percent.92
Having found a way to manage its debt, for the next few years the Elyton Land
Company and its waterworks remained solvent. But just barely. Real estate lot sales
were few and far between, and revenue from water sales fell far short of the cost of
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providing it. The situation grew so desperate that at the urging of the company directors,
on 25 January 1877, the stockholders voted at their annual meeting to allow Major W. A.
Walker of London, England to negotiate the sale of the entire company- including 2,576
city lots, 3,286 acres of other nearby land, the Relay House Hotel, and the waterworksfor £60,000. The directors let it be known that if the sale fell through, each stockholder
would be expected to “. . . pay his proportion of the debt . . . .”93
Two months later, in March, 1877, the company owed $9,500 and had no money
to pay the debts. Major Walker had not yet sold the company, and President Caldwell
could find no buyers for company bonds in the open market. Stockholders had no other
reasonable choice but to raise the money by buying the bonds themselves: six paid cash
for bonds at a twenty percent discount, while seven others exchanged company stock at
$25 per share for bonds at the same discount.94 After the company paid its debts with
cash from discounted bonds and stock swaps, Major Walker’s attempt to sell the
company and its waterworks warranted no further mention.
In spite of its chronic shortage of cash and its ongoing failure to make ends meet,
the company’s waterworks continued to reliably deliver fresh water to the city. From the
moment water began flowing through the system four years earlier, the public had grown
ever more reliant upon it. Homes connected to the waterworks were transformed:

At first faucets were attached to a single pipe in the yard, and how
convenient this was and labor saving compared to drawing water from a
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well. Later when faucets were in the houses and sinks and bath tubs were
installed, joy was unspeakable; to think of having just as much water as
you wished to use, with just one turning of a screw and the “twist of the
wrist.” [sic]95

The waterworks gained ever more favor as merchants, professionals, and other business
owners came to appreciate the utility and convenience of having a water faucet at their
workplace. On a grander scale, the system benefitted the public at large: in the hot, dry
summer, the air downtown was much easier to breathe after city workers tapped the
system for water to spray down the dusty streets. Of even more benefit to the public, the
waterworks made it possible for firemen to prevent blazes from becoming conflagrations
that could burn much of the city to the ground, as happened in Chicago in 1871 and in
Boston in 1872.
The city’s first faint stirrings of recovery were quickened by improved fire
protection. In June, 1877, as lot sales picked up and structures began rising in the newly
developing areas of the city, the Mayor and Aldermen requested that the waterworks add
fifteen new fire hydrants to its system. The Elyton Land Company agreed to do so,
provided that Mayor and Aldermen committed the city to pay $1,000 per year for the use
of the fifteen hydrants. The annual fee would be payable in monthly installments ($83.33
per month for all fifteen hydrants, or $5.55 per hydrant per month), which would fall due
“. . . at the beginning of each month . . . ,” and would be regarded as “. . . preferred claims
upon the treasury of said Mayor and Aldermen. . . .” Further, by the same terms but at a
different rate, the Mayor and Aldermen agreed to pay a usage fee of $50 per year for each
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additional hydrant installed ($4.17 per hydrant per month). Even though their 1872
waterworks contract could be voided only fifteen years hence, the company and the city
agreed that the new fire hydrant contract would have a duration of twenty-five years.96
Assured that fire hydrants would henceforth generate a steady stream of revenue, the
waterworks began extending its mains and adding branch lines to accommodate them.
Expansion of the waterworks was another solid indicator that the Depression’s
worst days were over for Birmingham. Even more compelling evidence of improving
conditions came when several of the area’s established businesses- coal mines in
particular- ramped up their production. The strongest signal of all came when groups of
investors saw fit to establish new industrial enterprises in Jones Valley.
Industrial startups needed workers. Existing operations that sought to increase
production called for still more workers. As a consequence of surging demand for both
skilled and unskilled workers, the local labor pool began to swell with dozens, then
hundreds of additional workers. With more workers- some with their families- crowding
into the city, demand for goods and services rose. Lured by prospects of busy trade and
steady profits, more merchants and professionals gravitated to the city. So long as
legitimate opportunities kept beckoning, entrepreneurs kept coming to Birmingham. The
cycle spun on and on, gaining momentum, feeding on itself as the pace of local economic
activity accelerated.
The Birmingham that recovered from the grim years of epidemic and depression
rested on a much more solid foundation than it had before. The earliest, first version of
96

ELC Minutes, 67- 71.

62
Birmingham- whose population peaked at 4,000 residents- could not have supported that
many people for much longer than it did. Besides not having enough water, the city then
had a severe shortage of employers, and of jobs. Epidemic and depression were not the
only reasons why the city slumped so deeply and recovered so slowly: failure to begin
large-scale extraction and processing of the area’s minerals stunted the city’s growth
every bit as much as the catastrophes it just endured. As company president Caldwell
noted, the early city’s chief weakness had been:

“. . . there was nothing to support the town. It started up too fast; there
were no manufactures here; . . . [after epidemic and panic] the town was
flat, so that most of the people left. There was nothing here to support
them, nothing for them to do. . . .”97

The new Birmingham would have plenty of water, a greater number of mining and
manufacturing operations, and no shortage of steady jobs in many fields of endeavor.
The city would not languish and wither as it did before; too many wealthy and important
men had too much invested in the community to let that happen.
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CHAPTER VI
THE FIRST FURNACE BOOM

Fueling Birmingham’s recovery was fuel itself. Not charcoal- the traditional fuel
used to make iron in local furnaces- but coal from area mines. Because of its impuritiesespecially sulfur- and its friability, local coal had long been deemed unsuited for ironmaking. Such notions were dispelled on 11 March 1876, when experiments at the Eureka
Mining and Transportation Company proved that local coal- after being heated in an oven
that baked out its moisture and impurities- yielded “coke” that burned hot enough and
clean enough to make high-quality iron.
Ramifications of the successful tests were immense. Long thought worthless for
iron-making, the area’s vast coal beds- certain seams of it, at least- were suddenly
understood to be an inexhaustible supply of fuel for smelting the nearby massive seams of
iron ore and limestone. By a fortuitous geologic anomaly, all the ingredients for ironmaking- the ores and the fuel- lay together in one place. Visionaries grasped at once that
this unique proximate placement of minerals allowed for tremendous efficiency of
production in making iron. The area was ripe for development, with service from two
long-haul railroads, and a new and growing city sprawled astride their junction. Largescale mining and manufacturing operations were at last feasible. Capital began to flow.
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The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company- thrilled that their huge investment
in Alabama might finally start paying off- contributed $125,000 to the Eureka enterprise,
including the purchase of $60,000 of company stock. After quietly accumulating thirty
thousand acres (about fifty square miles) of coal lands in and near Jefferson County,
Henry DeBardeleben and James Sloss teamed with Truman H. Aldrich to form the Pratt
Coal and Coke Company. 98 Several months later, the Elyton Land Company granted
DeBardeleben a right-of-way to build a railroad to link the forthcoming Pratt Company
coal mines (about six miles west of the city) to downtown Birmingham.99 Significantly,
the railroad right-of-way included direct access to strategic blocks of land that the Elyton
Company denoted as “Reserved for Mechanical Enterprises.”100 After enlisting the aid of
his friend Thomas T. Hillman, DeBardeleben set about building a cluster of “mechanical
enterprises” that would soon become famously known as the “Alice Furnace,” named
after DeBardeleben’s eldest daughter.101 (See Figure 6.1)
By the end of 1880, three iron furnaces were operating in Jefferson County: two
Eureka Company furnaces at Oxmoor about 5.8 miles south of the city center, and oneAlice Furnace- located in downtown Birmingham. Within three years, the county added
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five more iron furnaces. James Sloss built the next one, helped by $80,000 in funding
from the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. Located within sight of the Alice Furnace,
Sloss’s new furnace rested on fifty acres donated by the Elyton Land Company, at the
opposite end of the “Railroad Reservation,” on another tract designated by the Elyton
Company as “Reserved for Mechanical Enterprises.” Not to be outdone by his friendly
rival, DeBardeleben opened another furnace- the Mary Pratt Furnace (named for his
mother-in-law)- on land just northeast of Sloss’s Furnace. Weeks later DeBardeleben
added another furnace beside the original Alice. Tit-for-tat, in October, 1883, three
months after “Big Alice” rose alongside “Little Alice,” the Birmingham skyline received
its fifth towering stack when “Sloss City Furnace Number Two” came into blast beside its
twin.102
Meanwhile, ten miles southwest of Birmingham, a major new player entered the
local iron-making mix. Finally making productive use of the extensive resources
acquired by their patriarch just after the Civil War, the Woodward family of Wheeling,
West Virginia- Travers Daniels’ old pals- swooped into the district and quickly
established Jones Valley’s most tightly integrated iron manufacturing operation.103
Extensive as they were, Woodward’s operations seemed small when compared to
the concentration of industry in downtown Birmingham. The Elyton Land Company’s
program of inducements worked all too well: offers of free land and free rights-of-way
were eagerly snapped up by the local area’s budding magnates, DeBardeleben and Sloss.
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As the first to build iron furnaces in downtown Birmingham, they got the city’s two
choicest industrial tracts. Because of the unique track layout in the city center, the Alice
Furnaces and the Sloss City Furnaces had direct access to the main-line tracks of both of
the city’s long-haul railroads. To make the tracts even more appealing, both furnace
complexes lay just outside the city’s boundaries, and were not subject to city regulations
and taxes.
By controlling the placement of the city’s first railroads and manufacturing plants,
the Elyton Land Company ensured that the city would grow according to their plan. And
grow it did, as thousands of skilled and unskilled workers- many with families- flooded
into the city, looking for jobs and a place to live. All around the new fire-breathing
factories, the bustling grid of Birmingham began filling its empty blocks. The city’s
population soared, as did the need for housing, and for the services required to a make a
modern city thrive. To tend to the city’s rapidly growing, ever more diverse needs,
enterprises great and small needed places to set up shop. Demand for real estate lots
intensified. Land values spiraled upward. Brisk sales of ever more expensive lots
fattened the Elyton Land Company’s cash balances. Shareholders were delighted.104
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Year

Average
Lot Price

Annual
Property
Sales

1880
1881
1882
1883

260
360
511
905

69,448
106,995
176,713
355,817

Table 6.1

Elyton Land Company Fortunes

By early 1881, the tide began to turn for the Elyton Land Company. Wisely
looking ahead, its managers used a portion of lot sales proceeds to upgrade the
waterworks. Under the guidance of Superintendent Milner, the company replaced its
eight-inch diameter force main pipeline with a twelve-inch-diameter main. Next, they
upgraded the old 500,000 gallon-per-day Worthington engine to a compound condensing
duplex Blake engine rated at 2,250,000 gallons per day. The following year they added
another Blake engine, doubling the system’s pumping capacity. To handle the added
flow, Milner’s forces dug another reservoir next to the one built by Daniels, which they
enlarged. The two side-by-side reservoirs- which took up all the space on the hilltopraised the system’s storage capacity from 1,000,000 gallons to 3,250,000 gallons.105
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Figure 6.2

Milner’s 1882 Reservoir Expansion

Besides improving the performance and capacities of its existing waterworks
layout, in 1881 the Elyton Land Company began actively seeking additional water
sources.106 As expected, rapid urban growth quickly absorbed the waterworks muchimproved capacity. With five iron furnaces, thousands of new residents, and scores of
new businesses of every type and size- and no sign of abated growth- by late 1883 the city
was clearly headed for another water shortage. Tight water supplies combined with a
constant, ever-increasing demand for water presented an opportunity for greater profit: on
26 January 1882, the Elyton Company shareholders instructed the directors to “revise the
water rates.”107 Company revenues and profits kept rising: by January, 1883, the Elyton
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Land Company was completely out of debt, with all its payables settled and all its bonds
retired. For additional waterworks improvements totaling $25,000, it paid cash. Finances
were rosy enough for the company to easily pay shareholders a twenty-five percent
dividend, while at the same time further enlarging its waterworks to keep pace with the
city’s ongoing frantic growth.108
As the 1880s wore on, the pace of growth accelerated. After a lull caused by a
national economic recession in the middle years of the decade, businesses, industries, and
people flocked like never before to Birmingham, Jones Valley, and Jefferson County.
Several newcomer industrialists became players in the local economy by taking the place
of entrepreneurs who decided to sell their built-up holdings. One of the first to cash in his
chips and leave the game was Henry DeBardeleben, who in 1884 sold his interests in the
Alice Furnaces and the Pratt Coal and Coke Company to Tennessee industrialist Enoch
Ensley for $1,000,000- the first million-dollar-deal in the Southern coal and iron
industry.109 Not long thereafter, in November, 1886, James Sloss sold his Sloss Furnace
Company to a group of Virginia capitalists for $2,000,000.110 Both sales had profound
effects on the further development of the area economy.
Sloss’s deal was several years in the making. Its roots lay in the establishment of
Birmingham’s third long-haul rail line: the Georgia Pacific Railroad. As part of the
Richmond Terminal system of railroads, the Georgia Pacific’s main purpose was to build
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and operate a 400-mile-long line of railroad linking Atlanta to Greenville, Mississippi,
and its inland port on the mighty river. By routing their rail line through Birmingham, the
Georgia Pacific expected to haul significant tonnages of Jefferson County minerals and
manufactures.111 In anticipation of its line being completed, the Georgia Pacific’s parent
company purchased the Milner Coal and Railroad Company for $375,000, making John
Milner a rich man.112 While its work crews built eastward from Greenville and westward
from Atlanta, the Georgia Pacific gratefully accepted the inducements offered by the
Elyton Land Company, which included extensive grants of rights-of-way and land.
In welcoming the Georgia Pacific to Birmingham, the Elyton Company specifically
provided for its depot, shops, and side tracks, while also guaranteeing access to the
“Union Passenger Depot” and the “common railroad right of way” in the city center. As a
final bonus, the Elyton Company donated a downtown lot for the Georgia Pacific’s
general offices, to be relocated from Atlanta.113
During the process of establishing their Birmingham operations, several Georgia
Pacific managers came to know James Sloss. An association that began with the new
railroaders in town calling on a local iron manufacturer- selling service, looking for cargo
to haul- evolved into an ever closer relationship. Bound and determined to begin mining
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coal, making iron, and hauling freight and passengers on their railroad, the Virginia
investors who owned the Georgia Pacific made Sloss an offer he could not refuse.
Compared to the lavish attention it paid to the Georgia Pacific, the Elyton Land
Company practically ignored the fourth long-haul railroad to arrive in Birmingham. In
1883, the Columbus and Western Railway- a division of the Central of Georgia Railroadcompleted its branch line between Columbus, Georgia and Birmingham. Approaching
Birmingham from the east- its main line running side-by-side with the Georgia Pacific for
the last few miles into the city- the Columbus and Western had far less effect on the
area’s industrial development than did any of the other local railroads.114
The fifth and last railroad to enter Birmingham before 1890 was the Kansas City,
Memphis, and Birmingham Railroad, which completed its line from Memphis to
Birmingham in 1887. Ignored like the Columbus and Western- perhaps due to the
competition it posed to the favored Georgia Pacific Railroad- the Kansas City, Memphis,
and Birmingham received no welcome or inducements from the Elyton Land Company.115
Heralded or not, the addition of three more long-haul railroads transformed
Birmingham into a railroad hub. (See Figure 6.3). Before the new carriers arrived, the
city’s first two railroads offered good connections: the Louisville & Nashville provided
single-line (though sometimes indirect) service to Memphis, St. Louis, Cincinnati,
Louisville, Nashville, Montgomery, Mobile, and New Orleans, while the Alabama Great
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Southern Railroad (successor to the Alabama and Chattanooga) provided much better
service to Cincinnati, New Orleans, and Chattanooga via its vaunted “Queen and
Crescent” route. By far the most important of Birmingham’s new rail connections was
the Georgia Pacific route to Atlanta, which significantly cut travel time between the two
cities. The new Kansas City, Memphis, and Birmingham route afforded a similar savings
in travel time to Memphis.
With or without the Elyton Land Company’s help, Birmingham became ever
easier to reach. As a consequence the city grew even faster; so much so that new
residents overflowed into communities that sprouted beyond the fringes of Birmingham
and its encompassing Elyton Company lands. To accommodate the new surge of urban
growth, the Elyton Land Company had no choice but to continue expanding its
waterworks.

CHAPTER VII
CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSION

Urban sprawl contaminated the Birmingham water supply. As explained by
waterworks Superintendent Milner:

By the year 1885 the city had extended its population over a large territory,
draining into Village Creek above the pumping station, which made it
necessary to abandon that source.116

During the twelve years since the waterworks was built, five separate communities
established themselves on land that drained into Village Creek upstream from the Elyton
Company’s waterworks intake: Avondale, East Birmingham, Woodlawn, Gate City, and
East Lake. (See Figure 7.1). Following the common practice of the time, residents
dumped refuse and waste directly into the creek. Seepage and overflow from privies,
along with runoff from cow pastures and pig styes, added to the creek’s nastiness.
Outflows from upstream industries and businesses made matters even worse. Although
Birmingham built its first fifteen miles of sewers between 1883 and 1885,117 that effort
did little if anything to alleviate the poisoning of the city’s Village Creek water supply.
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The situation mushroomed into open conflict when Birmingham’s Mayor and
Alderman joined forces with the “Committee on Public Health” to accuse two of the
waterworks best customers and closest allies- the Sloss City Furnaces and the Mary Pratt
Furnace- of polluting Village Creek and putting public health at risk. Alarmed by the
political weight behind the accusations, and fearful of the liabilities inherent in delivering
tainted water to the public, the Elyton Land Company took steps to defend itself. In a
June, 1885 Board meeting, company directors ordered President Caldwell to hire an
attorney to aggressively pursue civil actions against polluters. The directors also
instructed Caldwell to “. . . proceed at once by a system of canals and aqueducts to obtain
a supply of water from Village Creek above the supposed cause of the pollution.”118
While getting set for legal jousts, Caldwell left W. J. Milner in charge of devising
solutions to the waterworks problems. With limited success, Milner first tried boring
several artesian wells near the pumping station; one produced about 150,000 gallons per
day. Next, Milner pumped and piped water from springs beside Village Creek, located
downstream from the pumping station.119 Such efforts proved to be wastes of time and
money, since the additional output from wells and springs fell far short of what was
needed to keep pace with the city’s unceasing demand for ever more water.
The Elyton Land Company was not the only entity taking steps to provide
Birmingham with clean, plentiful water. On 13 February 1885, the state legislature
answered the appeal of six citizens by granting a corporate charter to “The Birmingham
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Water Works Company.”120 Included in the group of six was James W. Sloss, who well
understood the Elyton Company’s waterworks state of affairs, having served as the
Chairman of the company’s Board of Directors for seven of the past eight years (from 1
March 1877 until 31 January 1884).121 Sloss’s insights helped define the actions the
Birmingham Water Works Company was empowered to undertake. Unlike the vague,
general guidelines that governed the operation of the Elyton Land Company’s
waterworks, the new water company’s chartered powers were specific, precise, and
tailored to the unique circumstances of Birmingham and Jefferson County.
Nineteen months of wrangling resulted in the Elyton Land Company buying out
the six citizens, taking over their corporation, and assuming control of their valuable
corporate charter. As explained by company president Caldwell:

. . . the Elyton Land Company bought out this corporation and transferred
their works to it, taking payment thereof in stock of the Birmingham Water
Works Company, which stock was then transferred to the stockholders of
the Elyton Land Company as a dividend. 122

On 8 October 1886, ownership and control of the waterworks passed from the Elyton
Land Company into the hands of a different corporation- The Birmingham Water Works
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Company.123 The new corporate entity acted as a subsidiary of the Elyton Land
Company. Its operations continued as before, with W. J. Milner as waterworks
Superintendent, answering to the directors and shareholders of the Elyton Land Company.
Corporate intrigues and changes of ownership had no effect on the practical
engineering challenges of bringing more water to the city. Despite being instructed to
draw additional water from sources farther upstream, Milner concluded that Village
Creek had to be abandoned as a source for drinking water. However, to Milner, the
directors’ idea of using canals and aqueducts made sense when applied to the Five Mile
Creek watershed, just north of Village Creek and the crowded, waste-generating lands it
drained. With no development in its uppermost reaches except for a few isolated small
farms, the clear-running, spring-fed Five Mile Creek qualified as an acceptable water
source. By diverting its flow through a canal, Milner calculated that Five Mile Creek
could provide the waterworks’ North Birmingham Pumping Station- and the city- with
4,000,000 gallons per day in the dry season.124
With this plan in mind, Milner negotiated the purchase of an irregularly-shaped
608-acre tract of land that straddled Five Mile Creek. The land was “cheap” and it
included “. . . an admirable site for an impounding reservoir, except it was in the
limestone.”125 Milner also purchased a strip of land sixty feet wide by 6.1 miles long
(totaling 52.7 acres) to house the canal linking the new Five Mile Creek water source to
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the existing North Birmingham Pumping Station.126 (See Figure 7.1). Initially, Milner
intended to build a dam fifty feet tall, backing up the waters of Five Mile Creek to create
a 127-acre reservoir. Not long after commencing construction, excavations “. . . revealed
[porous limestone bedrock] which created alarm and the work was suspended.”127 In
place of the great dam and reservoir, Milner instead built a small dam- the width of the
creek- that merely diverted the creek’s flow through a sluice into the newly-formed canal.
While Milner evaluated and resolved dam and reservoir issues, work on the canal
forged ahead. For most of its length the canal was “. . . merely an open ditch 4 ft. wide at
the bottom.” In a few short sections that passed over “dips” in the ground, the canal’s
flow was channeled through riveted wrought-iron pipes forty-eight inches in diameter,
one-fourth inch thick. A few sections of the canal’s walls were brick-lined, while
wooden flumes protected other sections. In places where livestock grazed, workers
strung barbed wire to prevent animals from falling into the canal.128
As work on the canal proceeded, a sawmill owner refused to allow waterworks
surveyors to enter onto his land unless the company purchased his sawmill and its
surrounding 480 acres for $10,000. Flush with cash, the company bought the mill and the
land for $9,900 and routed its canal through the property. Other downstream landowners
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threatened to file an injunction to bring canal construction to a halt. To forestall any such
lawsuits, Milner urged his crews to work faster. After nearly two years of digging, on 17
November 1887 the sluice gate opened and the waters of Five Mile Creek began flowing
through the canal into the North Birmingham Pumping Station’s reservoir.129
During the two years it took to build the canal, Birmingham and the Elyton Land
Company were transformed by a real estate boom. In early 1886, the city erupted in a
speculative frenzy that lasted for about a year. Land values in Birmingham and in other
nearby budding communities soared to previously undreamed-of highs. Many fortunes
were made, only to be lost when the market abruptly stabilized in 1887 at much lower,
more realistic levels. Shareholders of the Elyton Land Company were the biggest
winners, earning $5,570,000 in dividends between 1883 and 1887. By company president
Caldwell’s estimation, stock that fell to a low of $15 per share in the darkest days of
epidemic and depression had come to be worth $7,500 per share, which translated to a
value of $15,000,000, making the Elyton Land Company “. . . the most powerful
corporation, financially, in the South.”130
Throughout those heady days, Elyton Land Company managers hosted throngs of
buyers, handled fantastic sums of money, and watched delightedly as the value of their
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company’s holdings spiraled to unprecedented highs. Amid all this clamor, and in spite
of former Chairman Sloss’s involvement, the quest for a new water source ranked as one
among many sideshows. Besides the waterworks, several other concerns- each one
important to the company’s overall development effort- vied for attention and resources:
helping the Georgia Pacific Railroad get established was one such concern, as was the
construction of a new hotel. Funding the startup of another iron furnace on the
“Mechanical Enterprises” tracts came under study, and was eventually approved. Of all
the items on the company’s crowded agenda, selling more real estate lots topped the list,
especially during the flush time when land prices were the highest ever.
Prior to 1884, almost all of the city’s development took place north of the
company’s Railroad Reservation.131 At the birth of Birmingham thirteen years earlier, the
Railroad Reservation contained a single railroad junction: the Louisville & Nashville’s
main-line track crossed the Alabama & Chattanooga’s, then the two railroads’ tracks ran
close together, side-by-side for a mile before parting along their different routes. By
1887, the Railroad Reservation had grown into a busy switchyard served by five longhaul railroads, several local industrial railroads, and multiple streetcar lines. In this maze
of main lines, sidings, spur tracks, and crossovers, huffing locomotives lurched back and
forth, starting and stopping, constantly in motion, tended by switchmen and brakemen
who dashed about throwing switches and coupling and uncoupling strings of railcars.
The environment was noisy: a cacophony of shrieking whistles, clanging bells, and
shouting train crews, set to the background screech of steel wheels on steel rails. It was
131
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dirty, with locomotives belching ash and cinders that wafted with the breeze, clinging to
all they touched. At best, horse-drawn carts and carriages crossed over tracks with bonejarring impacts; at worst the horses spooked, resulting in a dramatic accident. At every
point where their rails crossed, streetcars were in danger of being struck by heavily loaded
trains. By any measure, the Railroad Reservation was an extremely hazardous place.
Like most other urban railyards of the period, injuries were routine and deaths were not
uncommon among train crews, streetcar and carriage passengers, and unwary pedestrians.
By its nature, Birmingham’s Railroad Reservation served as a barrier to movement, and
to development, of all the lands that lay to its south. (See Figure 7.2)
The Elyton Company owned much of that land. In fact, about half of the
company’s original holdings (2,044 out of 4,180 acres, or forty-nine percent) lay south of
the Railroad Reservation.132 Aside from the portion of those “Southside” lands that lay
within Birmingham’s corporate boundaries (about 368 acres) the remainder was:

. . . an almost unbroken primeval forest [concerning which] the endeavors
of the Agents of the Company had been directed for many years towards
preventing [the] depredations by wood-choppers.133

Prescient of the coming real estate boom, in early 1884, W. J. Milner suggested to
President Caldwell that the time had come to develop the company’s Southside lands.
With the caveat that any plans had to include a streetcar line and a substantial park,
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Caldwell gave Milner carte blanche to proceed. A few weeks later, the company Board of
Directors approved Milner’s conceptual designs by instructing him to survey and map the
company’s Southside lands according to the plan he set forth, which included a thousandfoot-long bridge spanning the Railroad Reservation at 22nd Street, a seven-mile-long
streetcar line, and a seventy-acre recreation area to be known as “Lakeview Park.” The
streetcar line featured a 2.3-mile-long boulevard that twisted and curved along the lower
slopes of Red Mountain, maintaining gentle grades while offering “. . . the greatest
practicable frontage of lots . . . .”134 Besides providing access to those prime lots, and to
Lakeview Park, “Highland Avenue” offered scenic views and a cool respite from the
smoke and bustle in the valley below.
On 4 February 1885, the legislature granted permission to proceed with building
the “Highland Avenue Railroad” (the Elyton Company’s streetcar line).135 Eight months
later, on 1 October 1885, W. J. Milner’s brainchild came into being when the Highland
Avenue Railroad and the 22nd Street bridge were opened to the public. The effect was
immediate: pedestrians, carriages, carts, and streetcars began streaming back and forth
between the Northside and the Southside. By providing safe passage over the dangerous
railyard, the Elyton Land Company not only opened its relatively isolated Southside lands
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to development, it also bridged the gap between the city’s divided halves, drawing
together two urban zones that had always been separated by railroad operations.
Rather than being content with this achievement, W. J. Milner soon devised a plan
to exploit it to the fullest. To make the most of the company’s newly-won legislative
authority to build railroads, Milner recommended that the company build yet another
railroad- the twelve-mile-long “Belt Railroad”- to attract ever more commerce to the city:

It was easy to see that the time was not far distant when terminal facilities
for any other railroads desiring to enter the city would be impossible at
reasonable cost. . . . To obviate this difficulty, I conceived the idea of
constructing a belt line, which would . . . supply this great need and invite
other railroads to come.136

President Caldwell and the company directors approved Milner’s plan, making it clear
that generosity toward railroads was a thing of the past. Though the company wanted to
have more railroads serving the city, unlike before, gifts of land would not be used to
attract them. Henceforth, the company would steer any prospective new rail carriers
toward connecting with their Belt Railroad, and purchasing land that lay alongside it for
their shops, warehouses, and depot. For local shippers whose goods moved on multiple
railroad networks, the Belt Railroad could “switch” railcar loads to and from any of
Birmingham’s long-haul railroads. By pointing out that a spur track on the Belt Railroad
served as a connection to all the city’s railroads, the Elyton Land Company convinced a
growing number of businesses to buy lots and build warehouses, along with other
“terminal facilities,” adjacent to their Belt Railroad.
136

Milner Highland History, 42.

87
Construction of the Belt Railroad began in early 1887. As work progressed, on 5
May 1887, the company directors merged their streetcar and railroad operations into one
corporate entity- the “Highland Avenue and Belt Railroad Company” (see Figure 8.2)and distributed its stock as a dividend to the shareholders of the Elyton Land Company.137
With Milner as its General Manager, the company’s dual-purpose railroad subsidiary set
about maximizing revenues and profits from the fare-paying general public, and from
companies that needed warehouse lots and railroad switching services.
At the height of the real estate boom, W. J. Milner’s workdays extended from
before dawn until after dusk. As Secretary and Treasurer of the Elyton Land Company,
he maintained a strict accounting of the daily flurries of real estate transactions. As
General Manager of the Highland Avenue and Belt Railroad Company, he oversaw the
day-to-day operations of a fleet of streetcars and switching locomotives. As Senior
Partner of the firm Milner & Kettig- an industrial supply house he founded in the late
1870s- he monitored sales and finances. As Superintendent and General Manager of the
Birmingham Water Works Company, he presided over all the operations that delivered
water to the city. Though he was not the city’s richest or most powerful citizen, W. J.
Milner was likely its busiest leader.
The weight of so many responsibilities did not bear heavily on W. J. Milner’s
shoulders. Being a natural leader, he was confident in his abilities but not overly so;
demonstrating that humility and wisdom by routinely seeking advice from qualified
professionals. Drawing on his experience as a Confederate staff officer- when he grew
137
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accustomed to issuing orders and having them obeyed- in the world of business Milner
delegated authority and inspired his subordinates to do as directed. No matter what
scheme he proposed, company directors noted that Milner always accomplished what he
set out to do. By consistently achieving good results, he earned their trust.
Formulating well-reasoned plans, then organizing men, machines, and material to
convert those plans into realities were among Major Willis Julian Milner’s chief fortes.
Remaining calm and making sound decisions, unruffled by intense pressure and
adversity, was another. So when a group of four local businessmen mounted a sudden
and direct threat to the Elyton Company’s waterworks subsidiary, like a chess player
moves ahead in the game, Milner set in motion a plan already laid.
Elyton Company managers were well aware that the city still faced an acute water
shortage. Even after the addition of the Five Mile Creek water source,

. . . the stroke of the fire bell was heard by them with fear and trembling,
as they alone knew that any considerable conflagration in Birmingham
would result in the entire exhaustion of the water supply.”138

Motivated above all others to find a long-lasting solution to the city’s unrelenting water
shortage, Milner had studied the situation and was prepared stave off the new threat.
Led by Robert Jemison, Sr.- an investor in the Avondale and East Lake real estate
development companies, and in Birmingham street railways- on 28 February 1887 the
four interlopers secured a legislative charter for the “Birmingham and Cahaba River
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Water Works Company.”139 The ominous new entity could not have emerged at a busier
time for Milner: the real estate boom was at its peak, the Five Mile Creek canal was in the
midst of being built- its reservoir issues unresolved- construction of the Belt Railroad was
just getting underway, and the Highland Avenue streetcar line was hauling thousands of
passengers each week. Regardless of all those important undertakings, Milner and the
Elyton Company’s directors had no choice but to grapple with the new issue and quash
Jemison’s new enterprise. Though the legislature specifically forbade the new water
company from tapping into any of the Elyton Company’s existing water sources, it
authorized Jemison and his cohorts to “. . . take, divert, use and condemn the water of the
Cahaba River . . . ,” 140 which, by intention or not, happened to be the very source that
Milner had recently determined to be the best option for supplying the long-term water
requirements of Jefferson County’s fast-growing industrial metropolis.
Being no stranger to surprise attacks while hard-pressed, Major Milner responded
with aplomb. Calling upon every reserve of accumulated trust, he recommended to the
company directors that they approve the most costly expansion ever made to their
waterworks: a half-million-dollar upgrade to tap into a new and distant water source.
Without objection they approved. Milner immediately swung into action, causing
Jemison’s scheme to soon be cast into the dustbin of History.
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CHAPTER VIII
A RIVER REROUTED

Diverting the waters of the Cahaba River into Birmingham was a monumental
undertaking. No one better understood that than W. J. Milner, who conceived and
designed the system that made it happen. Working from data gathered by his staff of four
full-time surveyors and engineers, Milner selected a route that drew water from a Cahaba
River pumping station, channeled it through a 7.57-mile-long pipeline that rose and fell
with the terrain, to the pipeline’s end near the Birmingham city center, at an elevation
nearly four hundred feet above the distant river. Along the way, the pipeline passed over
hills and under creeks to feed two reservoirs, then ran onward through two mountains
until it reached the city. Milner rounded out the new waterworks with a coal mine, to
provide fuel for the steam engines that powered the system’s pumps.141 (See Figure 8.1).
In the company’s earlier days of strained finances, a scheme this bold and
ambitious would never have been seriously contemplated. But at the peak of the real
estate boom, when the tidal wave of cash made almost all things possible, a half-milliondollar commitment to expand the waterworks was but one among many Elyton Company
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Figure 8.1

The Cahaba River Water Supply System
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investments. With nearly five million dollars in property sales over the preceding year,142
the company paid handsome dividends to shareholders, and had millions in profits left
over to invest. On 5 May 1887, as Milner formed plans to build the Cahaba River
extension, Elyton Company shareholders and directors voted to allocate one million
dollars toward “. . . the erection of a Rolling Mill and such other manufacturing
enterprises as in their [Board of Directors’] judgement may be expedient . . . .”143 Largess
in industrial speculations eclipsed funding for solid infrastructure improvements, setting a
trend that would come back to haunt the company.
Such zeal was understandable, given that speculation in industrial concerns, and
in land, overshadowed all other commercial activity in 1887- 1888 Birmingham. The
biggest deals got the most attention: all eyes turned toward Enoch Ensley when he
merged the Pratt Coal and Coke Company, Alice Furnaces, and Linn Iron Works with the
well-established Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company, thereby ushering a
powerful new industrial concern into the city’s economy. As President of the Tennessee
Company, Ensley became enraptured by the Elyton Land Company’s towering success,
and attempted to build his own similarly successful land company. Though that venture
ended in spectacular failure, Ensley nonetheless oversaw the construction of four iron
furnaces near the Pratt mines. Soon after the last of the four furnaces came into blast,
Ensley resigned as President, leaving the Tennessee Company’s furnaces and mines in the
hands of his successor.
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Concurrent with Enoch Ensley’s determination to build iron furnaces and a new
city, Henry DeBardeleben reentered the local fray seeking to do the same things. His
efforts were much more successful: the newly-formed DeBardeleben Coal and Iron
Company rapidly grew into an industrial powerhouse, and the town he foundedBessemer, thirteen miles southwest of Birmingham- took root and thrived. In a buying
and building spree that lasted nearly four years, DeBardeleben accumulated six iron
furnaces (four newly built, plus the two Eureka furnaces at Oxmoor,) along with 150,000
acres of mineral lands (about 234 square miles); “more coal and iron ore than had any
other concern in the South during that decade.”144
By the end of April, 1889, no fewer than twenty iron furnaces were operating
within a fifteen mile radius of downtown Birmingham, supported by dozens of coal and
iron ore mines. Sprawling networks of rails linked all these facilities together; none more
effectively than the Louisville & Nashville’s “Birmingham Mineral Railroad.” (See
Figure 8.2). While W. J. Milner’s “belt railroad” ran along the periphery of downtown
Birmingham, the Louisville & Nashville’s much larger railroad loop encircled the
Birmingham mineral district, running all the way from Bessemer in the south to Irondale
in the north. By offering direct service to many if not most of the area’s mines and
factories, the Louisville & Nashville positioned itself to haul the lion’s share of the area’s
freight traffic, especially bulk materials like coal, coke, and iron ore. To further solidify
its hold on the greatest portion of the area’s rail freight traffic, the Louisville & Nashville
began building branch lines that extended outward from its loop around Birmingham.
144
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These new branch lines almost always terminated near coal or iron ore deposits, which,
when rail service became available, could be mined and shipped to Birmingham’s coke
ovens and iron furnaces, or to other customers elsewhere.
As the Louisville and Nashville- and to a lesser degree the district’s other longhaul railroads- extended their tentacles ever farther into the countryside in search of more
minerals to haul, Birmingham’s network of street railroads stretched farther outward from
the city center, providing fare-paying passengers with regular service between their
workplaces and homes, and between the city center and its outlying suburbs. Towns far
afield- such as East Lake and Bessemer- came within easy reach. (See Figure 8.2).
Besides opening up suburbs for development, operating streetcar lines could be
quite profitable, especially on popular routes like those of the Highland Avenue and Belt
Railroad. With the surge of new residents, Birmingham’s streetcar lines had no shortage
of riders: between 1880 and 1890, Jefferson County’s population multiplied nearly
fourfold (from 23,272 to 88,501) while Birmingham’s city population swelled more than
eightfold (from 3,086 to 26,178). By 1890, the incorporated suburbs of Avondale,
Woodlawn, Ensley, Pratt City, Irondale, Trussville, and Bessemer totaled 19,118 of the
county’s population, while Birmingham’s unincorporated suburbs of Powderly,
Mechanicsville, West End, Cleveland, Green Springs, Smithfield, North Birmingham,
East Birmingham, Gate City, and East Lake counted for thousands more.145 This
remarkably rapid growth led to Birmingham being dubbed “The Magic City.” With well

145

US Census Bureau, Twelfth Census, “Table 5- Population of States and
Territories by Minor Civil Divisions: 1890 and 1900.”

96
over half the county’s population clustered within a few miles of the city center- most
residing in scattered communities tied together with networks of busy streetcar lines- by
1890 “Greater Birmingham” certainly qualified as the most dynamic metropolitan area in
the state, if not the entire Southeast region.
Just as the city’s streetcar network expanded to both drive and keep pace with
urban growth, so too did the city’s waterworks. Furnaces, factories, scores of commercial
enterprises of every type and variety, and most especially tens of thousands more citizens
all needed ever more water. To provide it, the Elyton Land Company’s waterworks
subsidiary was prepared to execute W. J. Milner’s plan to import Cahaba River water into
Birmingham. Before breaking ground on the project, the Elyton Company needed
contractual assurance that their $500,000 investment would not be lost. Well aware that
the twenty-year water supply agreement between the Elyton Land Company and the City
of Birmingham would soon expire, W. J. Milner secured the requisite assurances.
To bring up to date the relationship still governed by the terms of the 25
September 1872 contract between Travers Daniels and the City, Milner huddled with
Robert H. Pearson- the Birmingham City Attorney- and negotiated a new thirty-year
agreement.146 First, they correctly identified the provider as the Birmingham Water
Works Company. Then they revamped the system of water rates, which had remained
unchanged since being copied verbatim from the Lookout Water Works Company’s 1870
tariff. Milner and Pearson worked out a new system of rates that- in a nod to consumers
146
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and voters- included maximum allowable annual fees for domestic water use. Departing
from the conventional system of flat rates, the new agreement then introduced the
concepts of water meters and measured water use; setting up a system whereby the
Birmingham Water Works Company could install meters and charge rent for their use,
and then use those meters to tally each individual customer’s actual water consumption,
for use in calculating amounts due to the waterworks. Congratulating themselves for
their forward thinking, Milner and Pearson urged their superiors to sign the contract. The
Mayor of the City of Birmingham and the President of the Birmingham Water Works
Company did so on 1 July 1888, blissfully unaware that by so doing they lit the fuse to a
firestorm of public controversy.
Confident that the new agreement with the City was solid and enforceable, with
rates and terms that ensured the waterworks company would recover its investment and
thereafter return handsome profits, W. J. Milner began letting bids for various phases of
construction. He began the process before the new agreement was signed, closing bids on
28 June for brick work, on 30 June for machinery to be delivered in May, 1889, and on 3
July for tunneling, reservoir excavation, and trenching. Several days after that Milner
closed the bidding on the hundreds of pipe sections that would form the 7.57-mile-long
pipeline.147 As soon as he selected the last of his contractors, Milner began building.
Compared to the Elyton Land Company’s original Travers Daniels-designed
waterworks, Milner’s creation was vastly more complex, and more difficult to build by
several orders of magnitude. The original waterworks- as well as its new Five Mile
147
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Creek canal- was conveniently accessible by both roads and railroads, and was situated on
easy terrain, with all its facilities (except for the hilltop service reservoirs) located on the
valley floor. In contrast, the new waterworks route from the Cahaba River cut across
miles of swoopy, ridge-and-valley terrain that Milner characterized as “rugged and badly
broken,” accessible only by “fearful roads.” With winter rains, those roads- such as they
were- became so slippery and treacherous as to be impassible. When machinery for the
riverside pumping station arrived at the waterworks North Birmingham railroad sidetrack,
it was “. . . pulled over the Mountain by a yoke of six oxen, each trip taking three days to
go the nine miles.”148

Hundreds of thousands of brick were needed to line the walls and

arched roofs of the system’s two tunnels: instead of struggling to haul brick in by the
wagon-load, Milner opted to build brick-making plants on-site. Throughout the course of
construction, access to and from the project’s worksites remained a constant problem.
The flow of water into the city started at the pumping station beside the Cahaba
River. Milner gave careful thought to its placement; his first concern being to site the
pumping station well above the river’s maximum rise in full flood. Research suggested
that was about forty feet above the river’s average level; an elevation noted by Milner as
being “. . . difficult to obtain with exactness.”149 From the river’s edge, the system’s inleta twenty-inch pipe encased in a brick arch three feet wide at the base and three feet tallran 250 feet to a brick-lined well twenty-one feet in diameter. From the well, water
flowed through a pipe twenty inches in diameter into the pump house (a circular structure
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fifty-four feet in diameter, made of brick,) being pulled along by a “Worthington highduty direct acting compound condensing duplex engine,” with a capacity to pump
5,000,000 gallons per day. Though the pump house originally held only one such engine,
it was designed for two. Power to the Worthington engine came from eight steam boilers,
housed in an adjacent structure. Fuel for the boilers came from the company’s coal mine,
located a half-mile away on the opposite side of the river, accessible via a tramway
bridge. Drovers hauled coal from the mine in mule-drawn carts, easing across the
creaking bridge before dumping their loads beside the boiler house’s front door. Milner
proudly noted that by mining and transporting coal in this fashion, he fed fuel to the
boilers at a cost of less than one dollar per ton.150
From the pump house, the Worthington engine pushed water uphill through a
twenty-inch-diameter pipe for a steep vertical rise of 385 feet, over a horizontal distance
of only one-half mile. At the top of the hill, the pipe diameter changed to thirty inches,
and its route then ran downhill about eight-tenths of a mile to pass underneath a creek.
From there the pipeline rose and fell with the terrain for another 1.35 miles until it
reached a gap in Shades Mountain called “the Narrows,” and there fed into two
interconnected reservoirs. The upper and smaller reservoir, with an outflow 425 feet
above the river, had a surface area of five acres and a capacity of 28,500,000 gallons. The
lower and much larger reservoir, whose outflow was 410 feet above the river, had a
surface area of 13.2 acres and a capacity of 63,500,000 gallons.151 In comparison, the
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company’s two North Birmingham reservoirs had a combined capacity of only 3,250,000
gallons. The two new reservoirs therefore endowed the waterworks- and the city- with a
water storage capacity almost thirty times greater than it had before.
From the relatively gargantuan Shades Mountain reservoirs, the pipeline ran 1.45
miles to Tunnel Number 2- the Bald Ridge Tunnel, about 390 feet above the river- by far
the shorter of the system’s two tunnels at only 141 feet long. The pipeline then left Bald
Ridge, rising and falling for another 1.57 miles until it reached Tunnel Number 1- the
Red Mountain Tunnel, at an elevation about 380 feet above the river.152
Of all the obstacles in the pipeline’s path, Red Mountain was the most difficult to
overcome. While boring through strata 196 feet below the mountain’s summit, blasting
often unleashed torrents of mud and water that filled the tunnel and had to be removed
before work could proceed. Two contracting companies gave up the effort and quit; the
third finished the job. On completion, the 2,167-foot-long Red Mountain Tunnel ranked
as the project’s crowning achievement.153 (See Figure 8.3).
At the tunnel’s north portal, the pipeline’s diameter decreased from thirty inches
to twenty-four inches, then dropped down into Jones Valley to connect with the
waterworks’ existing mains at Twenty-Second Street and First Avenue North. Valves
opened and water began flowing from the Cahaba River into downtown Birmingham on
Christmas Eve, 24 December 1890, two and one-half years after construction began.
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Figure 8.3

Milner’s Red Mountain Tunnel, 1890
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CHAPTER IX
PRESSURES AND RETREATS

At long last, fears of the city running out of water could be laid to rest. The
Cahaba River dwarfed Five Mile Creek, and for the foreseeable future, their combined
flows would easily accommodate the city’s needs. Thanks to the massive reservoirs on
Shades Mountain, plenty of water was now available for industry, households, and
businesses, and also for public necessities like flushing out sewers, washing away piles of
horse dung, wetting down dusty streets, and most importantly, for fighting fires.
Politics, the profit motive, and the laws of physics combined to dramatically
enhance Birmingham’s ability to protect itself from conflagration. The political part of
the process began with the 1 July 1888 agreement between the City and the waterworks.
Terms for installing fire hydrants were obviously agreeable: prior to the new contract’s
execution, Birmingham had fifty-seven fire hydrants. Two-and-a-half years later, when
Cahaba River water began flowing into the city, the number of fire hydrants had
quadrupled, to a total of 230. Even better, the Shades Mountain reservoirs- being at an
elevation ninety feet above those at North Birmingham- helped to almost double the
water pressure available to firefighters; from fifty pounds per square inch to ninety-five.154
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To make the most of its dozens of brand-new high-pressure fire hydrants,
Birmingham’s city government saw fit to enlarge its fire department. It could afford to.
During the real estate boom, municipal revenues soared along with general economic
growth, and no city agency’s budget was boosted more than that of the fire department.
Working with revenues that quadrupled between 1885 and 1890 (from $57,600 to
$261,100), in 1890 the Mayor and Aldermen dedicated fully 16.4 percent of city revenues
to the fire department, up from a mere 4.2 percent in 1881, when all the city’s firemen
were unpaid volunteers, fighting blazes with nothing more than two “hand engines,” three
hose carts with a total of 3,000 feet of hose, and a hook and ladder truck. Ten years laterin 1891- the city’s fire department had expanded to include twenty-eight paid men, a
stable of fifteen horses, two steam-pump engines with four reels holding 6,500 feet of
rubber and cotton hose, a hook-and-ladder truck, and a “chemical engine.”155
Birmingham’s downtown merchants were overjoyed: the combined efforts of the
waterworks company and the city government caused their fire insurance rating to be
elevated from second-class to first-class, which slashed their insurance premiums for
property and inventory. Despite its sharp rise in revenues, the city could not afford to
extend first-class fire coverage beyond the “fire limits” in the city center. (See Figure
9.1). Residences and businesses that lay outside the fire limits therefore retained their
second-class or lower fire rating.
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Some but not all of the city’s heavy industries made their own fire protection
arrangements with the Birmingham Water Works Company. For a handsome fee, the
waterworks would install private fire hydrants in customers’ industrial facilities, and
thereafter assess rental fees for each installed hydrant- the same method it used for the
city’s public hydrants. Several manufacturers distrusted the city fire department’s ability
to put out fires on their property. Others balked at paying the waterworks’ fees for fire
hydrant installations and rentals. Some eschewed dependence on both the public fire
department and the private waterworks, relying instead on their own resources to fight
fires. Such companies were well-versed in efficient water use, and in minimizing dollars
spent on water. Although iron-making required a great deal of water, several local
manufacturers adapted their processes so as to recirculate and reuse water as much as they
could, often three or four times.156 Companies that developed advanced water-handling
skills sometimes went so far as to set up in-house fire departments, with their own water
supplies, pumps, pipelines, hydrants, hoses, and workmen trained in using that equipment
to fight fires in company facilities.157
Regardless of how they chose to protect themselves from fire, new industries kept
coming to Birmingham’s metropolitan area. During 1890, five more iron furnaces
opened in Jefferson County: three in Bessemer, one in Thomas (about three miles west of
the city center,) and one in North Birmingham; bringing the county’s total to twenty-five
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furnaces. With so many iron furnaces sprouting in such a small geographic area, the field
of producers became overcrowded, making Birmingham especially susceptible to the
ongoing national mania for corporate mergers and acquisitions. Seeking to “. . . gain
monopoly control over markets, achieve economies of scale, and enhance efficiency by
integrating operations . . . ,”158 Birmingham’s biggest iron manufacturer- the Tennessee
Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company- made its move in March, 1892, by purchasing the
DeBardeleben Coal and Iron Company and the Cahaba Coal Mining Company. Almost
overnight, the Tennessee Company ballooned into an industrial colossus. Its combined
assets included seventeen blast furnaces, 400,000 acres [625 square miles] of land and
minerals holdings, coal mines with an output up to 13,000 tons per day, and capital stock
of $21 million.159 After the merger, only two sizable local competitors remained in
Jefferson County: the Sloss Iron and Steel Company and the Woodward Iron Company,
whose combined assets seemed puny in comparison to those of the Tennessee Company.
As the local roll of independent iron manufacturers gelled into a few strong,
efficient producers, the once all-powerful Elyton Land Company began shaking itself to
pieces. Well-skilled at helping to establish new enterprises, the Company proved to be
far less apt at profiting from its investments in local companies. Not counting its own
subsidiaries, the company picked no winners. Propping up poorly performing businesses,
coupled with its tendency to be overly generous, caused the Elyton Company to act
against its own best interests, resulting in ever more confusion and loss.
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The process began as far back as November, 1888, when the real estate boom was
clearly over, but its memories were still fresh. Monthly revenues of hundreds of
thousands of dollars was still a recent phenomenon, and enough cash remained in the till
to enable the company to keep spending big. At its 14 November 1888 meeting, the
company board of directors voted to purchase $40,000 of Caldwell Hotel bonds, while
also resolving to pay no dividends until all of the company’s debts were paid.160 At its 29
May 1890 board meeting, the directors dedicated $250,000 to establish and endow an
Institute of Technology in Birmingham, while also resolving that “. . . no money of this
Company shall be used for any purpose except paying or discharging the debts of the
corporation and current expenses . . . .”161 Concerns about debt did not forestall big
expenditures.
In between those two meetings, the board of directors negotiated the sale of the
company to “John W. Johnson and others” for $3,200,000, only to have their
recommendation rejected by the shareholders at a special meeting held on 6 August
1889.162 Directors who thought the company would be better off dead did not inspire
shareholder confidence. Lacking a clear, unified sense of purpose, the company kept
spending more than it could afford. It also entered into commitments that restricted its
financial options. Bedeviled by contradictory objectives- free spending and fiscal
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conservatism- the company remained afloat, drifting and rudderless; a victim of its own
success.
In the management ranks, discord reigned. President Caldwell became dispirited
and submitted his resignation, which the board refused to accept; imploring him to remain
in office, which he did. Soon afterward, on 7 May 1891, the company reneged on its
$250,000 commitment to establish and endow an Institute of Technology, finding it
“impracticable” and likely to bring “serious embarrassment” to the company. At that
same meeting, directors voted to subscribe to $100,000 of capital stock in a proposed
steel mill, then approved a generous $18,000 payroll for the company’s top five
managers. Conservatism and free spending continued to clash.163
Reeling from within, the Elyton Land Company was ill-equipped to cope with the
national economic crisis that struck in 1893. Several great forces interacted to bring
about a panic, a recession, and a years-long depression. In the months leading up to the
crisis, the ongoing processes of overproduction and overexpansion peaked, giving rise to
waves of woe. Across America building construction declined, railroad construction fell
off sharply, and agricultural prices continued their years-long downward spiral.
Depression in Europe led to falling exports, and to falling stock prices, as British
investors sold off their American stocks to obtain cash. Disputes over using silver to
back federal currency led people to distrust the sanctity of the dollar. Loss of faith in the
economic system led to bank runs, more than 600 bank failures, and thousands of ruined
depositors. Nationwide, over 15,000 businesses failed, including seventy-four railroads
163
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with more than 30,000 miles of track. Unemployment soared along with foreclosures as
home-owning workers lost the ability to pay their mortgages. Credit contracted to the
point of being widely unavailable. All but the wealthiest were deprived of comforts.
Suffering along with the rest of the nation, Birmingham remained in the doldrums until
the Spring of 1897, when conditions begin to improve.164
Recovery began a bit sooner for Birmingham’s railroads, three of which went
bankrupt in the panic. The Alabama Great Southern Railway, the Georgia Pacific
Railroad, as well as the East Tennessee, Virginia, and Georgia Railway (which built track
into Bessemer between 1890 and 1893,) all became part of the 3,300-mile-long
Richmond and Danville Railroad System, which as a “speculative plaything”165 was
among the first of the nation’s railroad holding companies to declare itself insolvent.
With financing from Drexel, Morgan & Company, J. P. Morgan rescued the Richmond
and Danville in 1894, reorganizing its choicest rail lines into a new entity that he named
the “Southern Railway Company.” Soon thereafter, on 28 October 1894, the Presidents
of the new Southern Railway and the well-established Louisville & Nashville met in a
railroad car in Kennesaw, Georgia. Over the course of the next several days, the two
railroad executives instituted a policy of bilateral cooperation: they divvied up markets
and territories, set rates, and devised schemes to restrain competition, aiming especially to
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prevent other railroads from intruding into their respective agreed-upon territories.
Together, the two corporations dominated, but did not completely control the railroad
network serving Birmingham. The Central of Georgia Railroad remained solvent and
independent, as did the Kansas City, Memphis, and Birmingham Railroad.166
For the Elyton Land Company, conditions did not improve. Though the company
fell victim to the hard times and ceased to exist, its core lived on in the form of a new
corporation, chartered by the legislature on 10 February 1893.167 Simply entitled the
“Elyton Company,” the new corporate entity- led by the same slate of directors as its
predecessor organization- was specifically empowered to “. . . purchase the property, real
personal and mixed, of the Elyton Land Company . . . .”168 The new Elyton Company
subsequently did just that, while at the same time retiring its predecessor’s bonded debt
with capital raised by issuing bonds, and by selling and swapping preferred and common
stocks. After all the legal and financial machinations ran through to completion, the
Elyton Land Company was a nonentity, and the Elyton Company stood on its own, flush
with cash, possessed of all its predecessor’s “. . . real and personal property, rights and
franchises. . . .”169 Its once integral subsidiaries- the Highland Avenue and Belt Railroad
Company and the Birmingham Water Works Company- were left to their own devices.

166

Klein, 298; Cline, 132- 133, and 171; HAER Report, 17- 32.

167

No. 200] [s. 211. AN ACT To incorporate the Elyton Company. [sic]
Alabama General Assembly, Session of 1892- 93, (10 February 1893), 460- 462.
168

Ibid, 461.

169

ELC Minutes, 208.

111
No longer would the parent rush to assist its dependents, as the Elyton Land Company did
for the Belt Railroad in 1890, providing counsel to defend its rights in a dispute with the
Louisville & Nashville Railroad; and for the waterworks in 1888, by hypothecating its
own stocks and bonds to collateralize notes to buy pipe.170 After 1893, the fates of the
former subsidiaries rested entirely in their own hands: Elyton Company managers did
their best to heave them over the side like deadweight cargo.
First to go was the Highland Avenue and Belt Railroad. On 15 November 1894,
Company President H. M. Caldwell announced its sale to a New York agency- the
Columbian Equipment Company- which represented a union of three railroads: the
Chattanooga Southern Railway, the East and West Alabama Railroad, and the Seaboard
Air Line Railroad, which collectively agreed to purchase the Highland Avenue and Belt
Railroad’s freight and passenger operations, including its streetcar lines. They planned to
build an additional 133 miles of track to connect their geographically separated railroads
with the Belt Railroad in Birmingham, and to convert the Highland Avenue streetcar lines
from steam to electrical power.171 Though these ambitious arrangements failed to
materialize and the endeavor ended in bankruptcy, the Highland Avenue streetcar lines
survived to be taken over by a local competitor- the Birmingham Traction Company- in
September, 1897. The Belt Railroad’s freight operations also survived bankruptcy, to be
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purchased by the Frisco Railroad (successor to the Kansas City, Memphis, and
Birmingham) in 1902.172
The Elyton Company’s other disavowed subsidiary- the Birmingham Water
Works Company- was far more wearisome and difficult to unload. Many of the
waterworks’ problems stemmed from its 1888 agreement with the City, which when
strictly interpreted gave rise to puzzling contradictions. Use of water meters could be
imposed by the waterworks “. . . for the uses of the city and its inhabitants, and for all
manufacturing purposes . . . ,” excepting any of the contract’s “special provisions.”
Among those special provisions were low per annum rates for dwellings, water closets,
and bath tubs. In applying the rules, the waterworks could not force owners of dwellings
to use meters, or to pay for water at measured rates. They could, however, force
businesses to do so, even if a business occupied only a single room within a dwelling.173
These and other fine points were (somewhat) clarified in Smith v. Birmingham
Water Works Co.- a case that worked its way from the Jefferson County Chancery Court
to the Alabama Supreme Court. The conflict arose when Joseph R. Smith sought and
received an injunction to prevent the Birmingham Water Works Company from removing
his meter and shutting off water service to his three-story building filled with doctors,
dentists, and attorneys offices. Though the courts affirmed the waterworks company’s
right to sell metered water to businesses, the company paid a high price for victory.

172

Alvin W. Hudson and Harold E. Cox, Street Railways of Birmingham (Forty
Fort, PA, n. p., 1976), 15- 16, and 39- 44.
173

Smith v. Birmingham Water Works Co., Supreme Court of Alabama, November
Terms, 1893- 4, Vol. CIV, 315- 327.

113
Successful enforcement of the terms of the 1888 contract aroused widespread indignation:
the public’s opinion of the privately-owned waterworks dropped to a new low.
The waterworks negative public image went far beyond the usual hostility that the
public felt toward corporations in general. Six years of water use under the 1888
agreement- highlighted by objections aired in the State’s highest court- caused the
Birmingham Water Works Company to become universally distrusted and extraordinarily
unpopular. “Nearly all citizens continued to believe that the 1888 contract rates were
unreasonably high and that a “greedy” waterworks “octopus” was arrogantly amassing
outrageous profits.”174 Pilloried by local newspapers, the waterworks could do nothing to
stem the unceasing torrents of abuse directed against it. In spite of the waterworks’
strong financial performance, many of its stockholders were amenable to selling the
company under the best possible terms.
Company directors began by trying to sell the waterworks to the City of
Birmingham. Quickly they learned that selling a company to a political body is a
completely different proposition than selling a company to another for-profit business.
The political body they needed to convince- the city’s Mayor and Aldermen- served at the
will and pleasure of the Birmingham’s voters, who almost universally despised the
waterworks company. In an attempt to win over the minds if not the hearts of the
electorate, the company issued an official public statement that was published on page
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one of the city’s leading newspapers.175 Most likely written by W. J. Milner, the
statement was intended to extol the benefits to be had by all if the City of Birmingham
would buy the waterworks for the good of the people. Unfortunately, from start to finish,
the statement was a disaster.
Twice in its nearly 1,000 words, the statement insisted “. . . the water works were
not constructed as a money-making concern . . .”; a claim that the company’s detractors
received with jeers and guffaws. The statement admitted that the 1888 rates schedule was
unjust: “. . . the poor man who owns his dwelling worth $1000 may pay more for water
than his rich neighbor who owns a store house worth $100,000. . . .” Chiding its doubtful
readers, the statement declared: “Those who complain that they are charged more for less
water consumed than other people are like children who cry because they can’t get the
moon.” Comments such as these- delivered in an authoritarian, self-serving toneattracted no new friends. Worse, they defeated the ultimate purpose of the statement,
which was to make the waterworks asking price of $1,500,000 more palatable to the
city’s voters.176
In spite of the high price tag and the public’s loathing of the proposal, the city’s
leaders desperately wanted to wrench the waterworks out of private hands, and bring it
under the aegis of the City. To determine whether the waterworks was worth its asking
price, Mayor David J. Fox appointed a special committee to inspect its facilities and
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examine its bookkeeping ledgers. Glad to oblige the committee, W. J. Milner conducted
a guided tour of the waterworks and made its accounting books available for perusal.
Suitably impressed, the committee recommended that the City proceed with the purchase,
after knocking $100,000 off the waterworks’ asking price. Their assessment was
confirmed on 21 February 1894, when Mayor Fox and the City’s Alderman voted eight to
five in favor of accepting the waterworks’ offer to sell, at the reduced price of
$1,400,000.177 Believing they had at last devised a resolution to the bitter waterworks
conflict, the Fox mayoral administration expected kudos. Instead, their actions were met
with howls of protest, adding to the ill will that caused Fox to be voted out of office in the
next election. Had the City been able to secure the requisite financing, Mayor Fox would
likely have gone ahead with the waterworks purchase, in spite of public opposition.
When funding efforts failed, the waterworks company withdrew its offer to sell.178
Adopting a new strategy for the new mayor- James A. Van Hoose- the waterworks
presented a new contract proposal to the City. Based largely on the 1888 agreement, the
proposal included several inducements to permit the use of meters on domestic
customers, most notably a fifty percent rate reduction for five years, and a seventy-five
percent rate reduction for the sixth year. Unlike his predecessor, Mayor Van Hoose paid
heed to public concerns. He supported the drafting of a new waterworks contract,
provided it contained the ten changes he “suggested” at a public meeting on 29 May
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1895. Though his suggestions seemed reasonable to laymen and consumers, each
individual provision was sure to be costly to the waterworks. By any financial measure,
the notion that the waterworks might accept all ten was pure fantasy. Since the Mayor
opened the meeting by reading his list of impossible conditions, what followed was little
more than a venting of frustrations. W. J. Milner and waterworks attorney Alexander T.
London were in attendance and had very little to say, except to reiterate that meters would
substantially reduce wastage of water, which would in turn make water cheaper for
everyone.179
Their claim was hotly disputed at another public meeting held two days later. In
the short time between the two meetings, public anger intensified: it was just as well that
no one was there to defend the waterworks, for the mood was ugly. Several prominent
citizens took part in the meeting, including former mayor Alexander O. Lane- one of the
waterworks’ most strident critics. According to the newspaper reporters who were
nominated to act as the meeting’s secretaries, no one had a good word for the waterworks.
One of the first speakers asserted that the new contract proposed by the waterworks
company was “. . . a diabolical plot . . .” that would “. . . act as an oppression to
consumers. . . .” Former Mayor Lane declared that if the waterworks company were
allowed to install meters in houses, “. . . every man there would live to regret it. . . .” Mr.
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W. B. Leedy summarized the group’s objections by noting “. . . the strongest argument
against the proposition was the fact that the water company favored it. . . .”180
Against such vehement, intransigent opposition, the chance that waterworks
would secure a new contract with the City was near zero. Regardless, in the months and
years that followed the public airing of grievances on 31 May 1895, the company
steadfastly refused to give up trying. Even though the likelihood of success was
vanishingly slim, a tiny chance of being allowed to meter all its customers was better than
no chance at all. The payoff for that privilege was incalculable, but surely huge: metering
everyone would eliminate uncontrolled consumption of water, and establish a single rate
basis almost guaranteed to generate higher profits for the company.
Until the 1888 agreement could be replaced with a new contract, its terms- as
interpreted by the courts- governed the waterworks’ actions. The company therefore
installed meters on every customer it could, which included all the industries and
businesses it served, but no “dwellings.” In spite of the liberal consumption (or wastage)
that flat rates for domestic water use encouraged, the company still turned a consistent
profit, paying dividends that averaged 3.3 percent per year between 1888 and 1894, and
nine percent per year in 1895 and 1896.181 Though returns of nearly ten percent were
sufficient to warrant holding on to their stock, shareholders nonetheless remained
unsettled by being owners of Birmingham’s most despised business entity. When a solid
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company made a bona fide offer to purchase the waterworks at a good price, its largest
shareholders jumped at the chance.
By 1899, the Birmingham Water Works Company had matured into a strong
takeover candidate. To a holding company that specialized in purchasing and operating
privately-owned waterworks, it proved irresistible. Taking full advantage of federal laws
enacted in 1889 that enabled one company to control another by owning a bare majority
of its stock, in a few short years the American Water Works and Guarantee Company
established itself as one of the nation’s first public utility holding companies. The
enterprise was founded in McKeesport, Pennsylvania in 1886 by two brothers- James S.
and William S. Kuhn- who, like Travers Daniels, designed, built, and in some cases
owned and managed waterworks. By 1899, the wily Kuhn brothers expanded their small
partnership of five water companies into a scattered empire of twenty-five municipal
waterworks ranging from Pennsylvania to Kansas, and from Wisconsin to Louisiana.
(See Figure 9.2). As an incentive to sellers, with each waterworks the holding company
purchased, it “guaranteed” payment of the interest and principal due on the acquired
company’s bonds.182 Always on the hunt for promising systems to add to their domains,
the Kuhn brothers were excited to learn that Birmingham’s waterworks could be had at
the right price. At once they set about evaluating its worth, and were mightily pleased by
what they found.
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By the end of 1899, Birmingham’s waterworks included seventy miles of water
mains. From those mains, the company delivered water through 4,168 taps, which it
made available to consumers for a minimum deposit of $5, plus the cost of lead pipe.
Only 350 of those taps (8.4 percent) delivered water through meters, which were all
“owned, controlled, and repaired” by the company, and assessed at an annual rental fee of
$3- $20. Use of meters was “compulsory for large consumers and manufacturers,” and
the company could “compel use of meters except for dwellings.” For a city of 26,178
citizens (thousands more counting its suburbs) Birmingham’s consumption of water
through only 4,168 taps was quite high, ranging from a low of 7,222,660 gallons per day
to a high of 10,310,000 gallons per day. Such drains could be easily handled by a system
capable of pumping 23,000,000 gallons per day from three reservoirs with a combined
capacity of 148,000,000 gallons.183 By scale and volume, if purchased, the Birmingham
waterworks would be one of the holding company’s largest systems.
Taking into consideration all the Birmingham waterworks’ best and worst
features, in the Kuhn brothers’ eyes, the good far outweighed the bad. Birmingham’s
existing physical plant- which drew water from two separate sources- was skillfully
designed, allowing for cost-efficient operations. Pumps and pipelines bringing water
from the primary source were not quite ten years old, and in good working order. In an
unusual but welcome twist, Birmingham’s primary water source even had its own coal
mine that provided a reliable supply of cheap fuel to the system’s nearby riverside pumps.
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In terms of markets served, the Birmingham waterworks’ customer base was
spread among a variety of industrial, commercial, municipal, and domestic accounts,
without being unduly reliant on one type of customer, or on any one industry. Losing a
single major customer, or even several, would not cripple the company’s ability to turn a
profit. Supported by its diverse customer base, the Birmingham waterworks’ financial
outlook was solid: for the past several years, the current set of approved contract rates
allowed the company to earn healthy profits and pay respectable dividends.
Though the Birmingham Water Works Company was detested and reviled by the
local citizenry, press, and politicians, the American Water Works and Guarantee
Company was not put off: this state of affairs was nothing new to a holding company that
owned twenty-five other waterworks in fourteen different states. In all the cities it served,
public opinion ranked low on the holding company’s scale of concerns. Its managers
knew all too well that the service they provided was indispensable. No city could do
without water. No matter how much the citizens, the press, and the politicians postured
and threatened, unless a municipality purchased and operated the privately-built and
privately-owned system that delivered water to the city, in the end the people had no
choice but to buy the waterworks’ product. That plain fact usually relegated public
complaints and objections to the status of mere noise.
While public opinion ranked as a low priority, it could not be ignored.
Disregarding the people’s ire sometimes led to municipal ordinances and legislative
regulations that cut into the company’s profits. To prevent such ordinances and
regulations from being enacted and given the force of law, the American Water Works
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and Guarantee Company employed a staff of attorneys well-skilled in the art of politics.
From their point of view, Birmingham presented no extraordinary challenges.
By its thorough analysis, the American Water Works and Guarantee Company
judged Birmingham to be an excellent fit for its growing agglomeration of waterworks.
Though the holding company placed high value on Birmingham’s physical plant, diverse
clientele, and solid financial status, the feature that the Kuhn brothers and their advisers
found most appealing was the Birmingham waterworks’ potential.
As one of America’s most vibrant metropolitan areas, the City of Birmingham and
its environs were growing rapidly. The more the local area grew, the greater the strain on
its water supply. Robust and capable though it was, after only nine years of operation, the
Cahaba River water supply system was already overdue for a major upgrade. That need
had been envisaged by W. J. Milner, whose design left adequate space for the addition of
adjacent, parallel water mains between the Cahaba River and the city.
Reservoirs were another matter: though adequate at first, a reservoir capacity of
148,000,000 gallons was far short of ideal. To withstand a months-long drought, a
metropolitan area the size and dynamism of Birmingham needed a much larger surface
water supply, measured in billions, not millions of gallons.
While many urban planners perceived that shortage as a looming problem, the
Kuhn brothers recognized it as a tremendous opportunity. Their quick topographical
study revealed an obvious solution: damming the Cahaba River near the waterworks
existing intake- just upstream from the company’s coal mine- would flood thousands of
acres of sparsely populated land, forming a huge lake to provide Birmingham with all the
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water it would ever need, even in times of prolonged drought. The company that built the
dam and reservoir would thereafter own and control an infinitely renewable and utterly
indispensable resource. Perpetually replenished for free by rainwater and upwelling
springs, the new lake would store billions of gallons of Nature’s bounty, for later
distribution and sales to the waterworks’ captive local markets.
Given that the thirty-year contract between the City and the Waterworks Company
had nineteen years remaining, the American Water Works and Guarantee Company
deemed it feasible to commit to a large-scale, long-term investment in a Cahaba River
dam and reservoir. Not only would the company enjoy many years of revenues and
profits from selling the stored water, when the contract expired in 1918, if the City
exercised its option to purchase the waterworks, the company could rightfully demand to
be compensated for their entire initial investment in the dam and reservoir. The deal
seemed too good to be true. Barely able to restrain their glee at being handed the
waterworks equivalent of a gold mine, the Kuhn brothers made their purchase offer.
Glad to be rid of their bond liabilities and agreeable to the offered price of $87.75
per share, on 27 April 1899, four of the Birmingham Water Works Company’s largest
shareholders (including company president James T. Woodward) sold the majority of the
company’s stock to the American Water Works and Guarantee Company. The new
owner then extended to the minority shareholders a thirty-day offer to purchase their
stock at that same price.184 Transition to new management began at once, though with
few immediate changes to personnel and operations.
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At the new owner’s request, W. J. Milner consented to stay on as Superintendent
for several months. After a weeks-long vacation in Central America, Milner returned and
began training his replacement, a bright and energetic young attorney named A. M. Lynn,
who quickly absorbed Milner’s knowledge and insights. With vigilant guidance from the
holding company’s Pittsburgh headquarters- mainly expressed by a constant stream of
letters from W. S. Kuhn- Lynn commenced adapting the parent company’s policies and
procedures to the unique situation he found in Birmingham. W. J. Milner reacted
differently. Unaccustomed to such intense scrutiny, overwhelmed by the sheer volume of
correspondence it took to respond to Kuhn’s endless questions, observations, suggestions,
and demands, on 1 October 1899, Major Willis Julian Milner resigned after serving
twenty-four years as the waterworks Superintendent and General Manager.
W. J. Milner’s resignation signaled the end of the Elyton Company’s involvement
in Birmingham’s infrastructure. From its paramount importance in the city’s founding
days, by 1900- only thirty years later- the company was a mere shadow of its former self.
Having sold almost everything it conceived and built, the Elyton Company no longer
possessed the will to pursue opportunity, or even to survive. Just after the new century
dawned, the company sold the last of its land holdings to the Birmingham Realty
Company and went out of business forever. Having disposed of all its assets, nothing
remained of the city’s all-powerful Elyton Land Company but fading memories and
forgotten records. Though not widely emphasized, the company’s most important
contribution to Birmingham’s development was its establishment of the underpinnings of
municipal infrastructure, without which there would have been no Magic City.

CONCLUSION

Though other corporations invested huge sums in the community, the Elyton Land
Company did more than any other entity to shape and direct the city’s early development.
By purchasing thousands of acres of isolated uplands real estate, the company’s ten
original shareholders placed their personal fortunes at risk, gambling that vague
assessments of untold mineral wealth were more than mere conjecture. By persuading
two long-haul railroads to locate their junction at the center of its newly-purchased tracts,
the company threw open for development the heretofore remote local area, while
positioning itself at the heart of what they believed would become be a great new city.
After providing for the establishment of railroads and other industries, the Elyton
Land Company took into account the diverse needs of a fast-growing populace, reserving
lots and entire blocks for public buildings, parks, and churches. As the city evolved, the
company continued to accommodate the needs and comforts of its citizens, especially by
providing the public with water for drinking, washing, and fire-fighting.
Despite flirting with bankruptcy in its early years, the company proved strong
enough to survive a cholera epidemic and several economic depressions. After a real
estate boom swelled the company’s cash coffers and made most of its shareholders
wealthy, the company’s directors sought to prolong the days of plenty by investing
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millions of dollars of profits in local businesses. Their strategy failed, along with all the
enterprises they backed.
In terms of profit and loss, the company’s own forays into railroad operations also
began with success and ended in failure. By broader measures, the Elyton Company’s
railroads did more good than harm to the company’s overall profitability: the Highland
Avenue streetcar line opened the company’s Southside tracts to residential and
commercial development, and the Belt Railroad encircled the city center with spaces ideal
for light industry.
After struggling for its first ten years of operation, the Elyton Company’s
waterworks subsidiary steadily turned a profit after 1883. At its own expense- utilizing
revenues from waterworks’ operations and funds from its own treasury- the Elyton
Company undertook two major waterworks expansions, both of which stimulated
metropolitan growth, resulting in higher profits for the waterworks. Activists who judged
waterworks’ profits to be excessive launched a popular movement to wrest control of the
waterworks out of the hands of its private owners, for placement into the hands of a
municipal authority. Their efforts failed, and in 1899, ownership of the Birmingham
waterworks passed from one set of private hands to another, delaying municipal control
of waterworks’ assets for another half-century.
As attorneys and accountants from Pittsburgh familiarized themselves with their
newly acquired Birmingham waterworks, they did so in a thriving urban environment,
seemingly far removed from the quiet cornfields and cow pastures of the Elyton
Company’s first days. Within a few short months, the Pittsburgh managers realized that
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another set of nearby cornfields and cow pastures held the key to Birmingham’s
continued growth, and to their own prospects for rising profits. Just beyond their Cahaba
River waterworks intake, thousands of mostly vacant acres lay waiting to be purchased,
cleared, and flooded, thereby forming a multi-billion-gallon reservoir, sufficient for
decades of urban expansion. Though less daring than the Elyton Company’s founding of
the city, building the metropolitan area’s first major reservoir would certainly qualify the
American Water Works and Guarantee Company as one of Birmingham’s infrastructure
pioneers, equally unworthy of being tagged as a profiteer.
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APPENDIX A
TARIFF OF WATER RATES

from Lookout Water Works Company 18 June 1870 rate sheet
in Elyton Land Company Minutes , 73- 83
(entries categorized and reordered for clarity)
Annual
Fee

Fees for Domiciles
For a family of three persons or less
For a family of five persons or less
For a family of seven persons or less
For a family of ten persons or less
For each person over ten

18.00
21.00
24.00
30.00
2.00

For boarding house rates, add to the above for each boarder
Should the number exceed ten special rates will be given

4.00

Private bath or bath house
Shower by those who do not pay for tubs

9.00
6.00

Horse
Cow

6.00
3.00

Fees for Businesses
Public bathhouse, per tub

20.00

Barber shop of two chairs or under
Additional chairs

30.00
3.00

Wholesale or Retail:
any goods or shoe store or similar stores
employing more than five persons

30.00

same as above, less than five persons

24.00
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Annual
Fee

Fees for Businesses (continued)
Grocery stores:
First class
Second class (retail)

30.00
24.00

Confection and bake shop
Small bakery

60.00
30.00

Banking houses, photograph galleries,
and dentist's offices

30.00

Doctor, lawyer, broker, and insurance offices

20.00

Coffee house or drinking saloon:
First class
Second class

48.00
36.00

Eathing house:
First class
Second class

48.00
36.00

Eating and drinking saloon connected

75.00

For each soda fountain

36.00

For each billiard saloon

36.00

For each ice cream saloon

48.00

Special rates will be made with hotels, livery stables, breweries,
railroads, brickyards, gas works, rectifying houses, rolling mills,
tan yards, flouring mills, saw mills, fountains, and all large
consumers of water.
Tin, copper, sheet iron, or
shoemaker shops (18.00 to 30.00)

varies

Foundry

36.00
135

Annual
Fee

Fees for Businesses (continued)
Blacksmith shop, one forge or fireplace
additional forge or fireplace

18.00
2.00

Steam engines- charged by horsepower:
each horsepower, up to ten
exceeding ten, not over fifteen
exceeding fifteen, not over twenty
over twenty, special rates will be given

10.00
7.00
5.00

Washer women who take in washing
outside their own family

36.00

Fees for Builders
Building purposes, per porch of 25 cubic feet

0.05

Brick work, 10,000 or less

0.10

Brick work over 10,000 per 1,000

0.10

Plastering, 25 bushels of lime or less
over 25 bushels, per bushel
per square yard

1.00
0.03
0.01

Fees for Sprinkling
for sprinkling streets, sidewalks,
washing steps and, windows
per linear foot (must mean per street)

50.00

Half the width of the street, sidewalks.
steps, windows, etc. on one side

25.00

Corner lots, both fronts charged
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Annual
Fee

Fees for Sprinkling (continued)
After 1 July 1871 no permits for sprinkling
along will be granted, all such
attachments will be chargeable
for fire protection, as follows:
Per area of attachments

36.00

Street sprinkling carts, per 100 yards

2.00

Sprinkling yards and gardens, and washing
walks in same, per square yard

0.01

Washing carraiges, buggies, etc. by
momentum of the jet alone is prohibitedsuch a waste of water will not be allowed
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APPENDIX B
DANIELS TO WOODWARD LETTER, 15 MAY 1875
Images from University of Alabama Online Digital Collections
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